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ARMINIANISM EXAMIMED 



REVIEW 



I "A DISCOURSE ON PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION, 



PREACHED ON AN ESPECIAL OCCASION, AT GREENWICH, 
MASSACHUSETTS, 



BY WILBUR FISK, D.D." 

^^ Then Principal of the Wesleyen Academy, Wilbraham, Mass. \ now of the 
Methodist Seminary, Middletown, Connecticut. 



BY REV. TYLER THACHER. 



BOSTON: 

PUBLISHED BY PEIECE & PARKER, 9, CORNHILL. 
Chapman, printer— over 26, State street. 




1833. 



«5! 



i 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 



REVIEW 



OF 



"A DISCOURSE ON PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION, 

PREACHED ON AN ESPECIAL OCCASION, AT GREENWICH, 
MASSACHUSETTS, 



BY WILBUR FISK, D. D." 

Then Principal of the Wesleyan Academy, Wilbraham, Mass. ; now of the Methodist 
Seminary, Middletown, Conn. 



ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE BOSTON TELEGRAPH. 



BY REV. TYLER THACHER. 



"***©^PS*" 






BOSTON: 

PUBLISHED BY PEIRCE AND PARKER, 9, CORNHILL. 

Chapman, printer— over 26, State St. 

1833. 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 



^G^^G**** 



NUMBER I. 

This discourse has already received an uncommon share of pub 
lie attention. The ability with which the Sermon is written, and 
the celebrity of its author, have given it a pretty extensive circula- 
tion ; and it is thought by many that Dr. Fisk has, in this discourse 
put the subject of Predestination and Election forever at rest ; and 
that Arminianism has now gained a complete and decisive victory, 
It is my object in this, and in several succeeding numbers, to in- 
quire into the merits of this discourse. 

The text is contained in Eph. i. 4, 5. 

"According as He hath chosen us in him, before the foundation of the 
world, that we should be holy and unthout blame before him in love. Hav- 
ing predestinated us unto the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ, to him 
self, according to the good pleasure of his will" 

Dr. F. thus begins his discourse : 

"In this passage, the kindred doctrines of predestination and election 
are brought into view. To discuss them, to notice some errors respect- 
ing them, and to exhibit what is believed to be the scriptural and rational 
view of these doctrines, is the proposed object of the present discourse." 

Dr. F. enters upon his subject by boldly " examining — 

I. Predestination in general— 

II. Predestination, in its particular relation to the doctrine of election. 
I. By predestination, we understand an efficient predetermination to 

bring about or accomplish any future event. But as God alone has 
knowledge to comprehend futurity, and power to direct and control fu- 
ture events, predestination, in a proper and strict sense, can only be used 
in reference to Him. And with respect to God, predestination is that 
efficient determination which he has maintained from eternity, respect- 
ing the control, direction, and destiny of the laws, events and creatures 
of the universe," 



4 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

But what does Dr. F. mean by an efficient " predetermination "? 
The Dr.'s definition appears to confound the Divine decrees with 
the Divine Agency. But these, though inseparably connected, are 
entirely distinct from each other. Pedestination is, indeed, prede- 
termination. But the Divine predeterminations are not the efficient 
cause of any thing. ' The efficiency lies altogether in that Divine 
agency which carries those predeterminations into execution. The 
Dr. proceeds : 

"That God had a predetermination of this kind, there can be no doubt, 
and therefore, on this fact, there can be no dispute. But the ground of 
controversy is, the unlimited extent to which some have carried this idea 
of predestination. Calvin, on this subject, says — "Every action and mo- 
tion of every creature, is governed by the hidden counsel of God, so 
that nothing can come to pass, but was ordained by him." The Assem- 
bly's Catechism is similar — "God did, from all eternity, unchangeably 
ordain whatever comes to pass." And Mr. Buck defines predestination 
to mean, "The decree of God, whereby he hath, for his own glory, fore- 
ordained whatever comes to pass." With these definitions which, it is 
seen, are the same in substance, agree all the Calvanistic divines in 
Europe and America. To this view of predestination, others, and we 
confess ourselves of that number, have objected. We believe, that the 
character and acts of intelligent beings, so far at least, as their moral 
accountability is concerned, are not definitely fixed and efficiently pro- 
duced, by the unalterable purpose and efficient decree of God. Here, 
therefore, we are at issue." 

On this passage I would just remark, that I know of no Calvin- 
istic divines, who believe that either human actions or any other 
events are " efficiently produced by the unalterable purpose and 
efficient decree of God." Calvinistic divines, it is presumed, do 
not generally thus confound the Divine decrees with the Divine 
agency. Dr. F. however, evidently means to deny that God has 
decreed any of the moral exercises and actions of his creatures; 
and that He causes any of their moral exercises and actions by his 
own agency. For he says : 

"We believe, with the rigid predestinarians, that God hath fixed the 
laws of the physical and moral world, and that he hath a general plan, 
suited to all the various circumstances and contingencies of his gov- 
ernment: but that it is no part of this plan, efficiently to control and actu- 
ate the human will." 

Dr. F. then does not believe that it is proper to say to either 
saints or sinners as Paul did, " It is God that worketh in you to 
will and to do of his good pleasure/' seeing " it is no part of this 
plan efficiently to control and actuate the human will/' He does 
not believe that God seriously intends that " His people shall be 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. O 

willing in the day of his power"; for this would make it a part of 
the Divine plan to control and actuate the human will. Accord- 
ing to Dr. F. then, regeneration and sanctification do not "efficient- 
ly control and actuate the human will": they do not produce love 
nor repentance, nor faith, nor any voluntary exercises whatever. 
According to Dr. F. nothing of this kind is any part of the Divine 
plan. Dr. F. believes " that God hath a general plan, suited to all 
the various circumstances, and contingencies of his government." 
By "contingencies" I conclude that Dr. F. means events which 
take place by chance, or events which depend on no cause out of 
themselves; and among these, I presume he would include all the 
voluntary exercises and actions of mankind, which p. 16, he as- 
cribes to a "self-determining principle of the will." Now what 
does Dr. F. mean by that 'general plan which is suited to all these 
various contingencies'? Does he mean merely that it is God's plan 
to reward his creatures accordingly as they shall chance to be obe- 
dient, and to punish them accordingly as they shall chance to be 
disobedient? If their obedience and disobedience be contingent, 
or depend upon mere chance, it is difficult to conceive how God's 
plan of Government can ever settle the destinies of any of his crea- 
tures. Fo* should men chance to repent to-day, they may chance 
to commit the unpardonable sin to-morrow. Should they chance 
to be fit for heaven at death, they may chance to rebel as did the 
fallen angels after they had entered the abodes of the blessed. The 
very idea of chance or contingency in events which take place, pre- 
cludes the idea of fore-knowledge and even of conjecture concern- 
ing them. The very idea then of a plan which is suited to con- 
tingencies is absurd. A plan suited to contingencies is a plan 
suited to chance. And a plan suited to chance is a plan suited to 
incalculable and innumerable uncertainties. 

But what does Dr. F. mean by God's having a "general plan"? 
Does he believe that God governs the moral world ? He says, " We 
believe with the rigid predestinarians, that God hath fixed the laws 
of the physical and moral world." What then does Dr. F. mean 
by the "laws of the moral world"? Does he mean those laws 
which govern the voluntary conduct of mankind ? If " it is no part 
of God's plan efficiently to control and actuate the human will," it 
is difficult to see how God can be said to govern the voluntary con- 



D ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

duct of mankind at all ; or how He can be said to exercise any 
proper government over the moral world. Perhaps Dr. F. will say, 
God governs the moral world by motives, rewards and punishments. 
But if God governs his creatures in this way only, his government 
would be extremely limited. These motives, rewards and punish- 
ments, must not come through human instrumentality, but directly and . 
immediately from the hand of God. For He cannot be said to dis- 
pense them through human instrumentality unless he governs that 
instrumentality by controlling the human will. Besides, how can 
God be said to govern mankind at all, even by motives, rewards and 
punishments, if " it is no part of his plan efficiently to control and 
actuate the human will"? What kind of government over man- 
kind is that, which does not control the human will? Will Dr. F. 
say that God governs nations and kingdom. ? It is readily admitted 
that ' God reigns in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants 
of the earth J ; that ' the king's heart is in the hand of the Lord ; and 
He turneth it whithersoever He will.' But it is difficult to con- 
ceive how He can govern nations without governing the individuals 
who compose them ; or how He can govern either rulers or subjects 
without controlling the human will. 

Dr. Fisk applies the term ultra-predcstinarians to .Calvinists. 
Whether he has thereby done justice to Calvinists, or to his own 
reputation I shall not at present undertake to determine. 

Dr. F. proposes first to hear and answer the arguments in de- 
fence of the Calvinistic system, and then to bring up arguments 
against it. He says, 

"The supporters of this system (the Calvinistic ) endeavor to establish 
their views by a three-fold argument. The fore-knowledge of God— 
the necessity of a plan— and Scripture testimony." 

He then undertakes to state the first argument* He says, 

"The first argument is founded on fore-knowledge. It is sometimes 
contended that predestination and fore-knowledge are the same. This 
however by the more judicious is not now insisted on"; 

He should have said never was insisted on by the more judicious, 
but always denied by them. After clearly refuting this error, the 

Dr. observes, 

"The more common and plausible argument is, that the f^- kno \' 
ledee of God necessarily implies predestination. "For how, they ask, 
"can an action that is really come to pass, be foreseen, if it be not de- 
termined?' God fore-knew every thing from the beginning, but this he 



ARM1NIANISM EXAMINED. 7 

could not have known, if he had not so determined it." "God," says 
Piscator, "foresees nothing but what he has decreed, and his decree 
precedes his knowledge." And Calvin says, "God therefore foreknows 
all things that will come to pass, because he has decreed they shall come 
to pass." 

After this brief statement of the argument, Dr. F. undertakes to 
refute it. 

"But to this idea, (he says, ) there are insuperable objections. Pre- 
science is an essential attribute of the Divine nature. But a determina- 
tion to do this or that is not essential to the Divine nature." 

But how does it appear that the prescience or fore-knowledge of 
God, is more essential to the Divine nature than his determinations 
are? Takeaway his fore-kaowledge and He ceases to be God ; 
and take away his wise and benevolent determinations and He ceas- 
es to be God. But Dr. F. undertakes to prove this point by a put 
case. He shall speak for himself. — "For ought we can see, God 
might determine to make a particular planet, or not to make it, and 
in either case, the perfection of his nature is not affected." But how 
does this prove that Divine determinations are not essential to the Di* 
vine nature? Should God determine to make a particular planet or 
not to make it; in either case He must have some determination. 
Itis essential to the Divine nature that God should have a determina- 
tion on the subject, either that the planet should exist or not ex- 
ist. It is equally essential to the Divine nature that God should 
make that determination respecting it, which is wisest and best. 
And the same may be said of every other event supposable. How 
does it appear, then, that the Divine decrees are not as essential to 
the Divine nature, as the divine fore-knowledge ? In the case which 
Dr. F. has put, the Divine fore-knowledge can extend no farther 
than the Divine decrees. Had God determined to create a particu- 
lar planet, He would have fore-known its existence. Had He de- 
termined not to create it, he could not have fore-known its exis- 
tence, but must have fore-known its non-existence. His fore-know* 
ledge, therefore, in this case, must have been both commensurate 
with his decree and founded upon it. The Dr. proceeds. — 

"But to know is so essential to Him, that the moment he ceases to 
know all that is, or might be, under any possible contingency, he ceases 
to be God." 

It is freely admitted, that God cannot cease to fore-know those 

future events which he hag decreed without ceasing to be God 



8 ARMINIANISM EXAMINE!). 

But it is by no means clear that he must cease to be God by not 
fore-knowing future events which come into existence under a 
u contingency, " or by chance. It is no less absurd to suppose that 
Omniscience can foresee events which are absolutely uncertain; 
than that Omnipotence can produce events which are absolutely 
impossible. Omniscience can no more effect a contradiction than 
Omnipotence. But let us hear Dr. F. a little further — 

"Is it not absurd, then, to say the least, to make an essential attribute 
of Deity depend upon the exercise of his attributes ? — the divine pre- 
science depend upon his decrees and determinations ?" 

But there is no more propriety in calling the Divine fore-knowledge 
an essential attribute of Deity, than in calling his decrees such. Both 
necessarily^^ from the Divine attributes; but neither of them 
constitutes an essential attribute of Deity. The determination of 
God is an exercise of his heart, and his foresight or fore-knowledge 
is an exercise of his understanding. There is a difference between 
the essential knowledge of God and his fore-knowledge. His es- 
sential knowledge comprehends his own perfections, and thereby 
all things possible. But his fore-knowledge comprehends his own 
decrees, and thereby all future events. The Dr. says : 

"It would seem by this argument, that, if not in the order of time, at 
least, in the order of thought, and in the order of cause and effect, the 
exercises of an attribute preceded the attribute itself; and in short, the 
attribute must be exercised as a cause to bring it into existence! To 
this monstrous conclusion we are led by following out this argument." 

This is, indeed, a "monstrous conclusion;" and it is difficult to 
see how a man of Dr. Fisk's ability and ingenuousness should be 
led to it by following out the argument. The Dr.'s argumentation 
is substantially as follows : If the Divine fore-knowledge depends 
upon the Divine decrees, then the Divine fore-knowledge evidently 
depends upon itself; and is the cause of its own existence: since 
decrees and fore-knowledge are one and the same thing. This is 
the only way conceivable, in which the Dr. could come at this " mon- 
strous conclusion. " It appears, therefore, from the Dr.'s own rea- 
soning, that, "It is sometimes contended, that predestination and 
fore-knowledge are the same." Still, we had supposed that, with 
the Dr. himself, p. 5. 

"This however by the more judicious is not now insisted on. For it 
is self-evident, that to know and to decree are distinct operations ; and to 
every one acquainted with the common definition of the terms, they 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 9 

must convey distinct and different ideas. And if these are distinct 
ideas in the human mind, they must be also in the divine mind, unless 
it can be shown that these terms, when applied to God have an entirely 
different meaning from that by which they are understood among men. 
And as this cannot be pretended," it is no wonder that the Dr. was 
sensible that he had been led to a "moustrous conclusion." 



NUMBER IT. 

In my preceding number, I took notice of Dr. Fisk's "monstrous 

conclusion," that if the Divine fore-knowledge be founded upon the 

Divine decrees, then "the exercises of an attribute preceded the 

attribute itself; in short, the attribute must be exercised as a cause 

to bring it into existence ;" that is, to found fore-knowledge upon 

decrees, is the same as to found it upon its own exercises. After 

Dr. F. has conducted us to this "monstrous conclusion" we need 

not be greatly surprised, at finding immediately 

"connected with it another, equally monstrous and absurd. If God 
must predetermine events in order to know them, then, as the cause is 
in no case dependent on the effect, the decrees of God must be passed 
and his plan contrived, independently of his knowledge, which only had 
an existence as the effect of these decrees." 

In this last conclusion Dr. F. takes it for granted that all the 
knowledge of God consists in jfore-knowledge. So that if his de- 
crees in the order of nature, be antecedent to his fore-knowledge, 
they must be antecedent to all his knowledge. But the truth is, 
tfre Decrees of God may be, and really are, founded in his essential 
knowledge and wisdom, notwithstanding his fore-knowledge is 
founded upon his decrees. Dr. F. goes on to say, 

"What must be the character of that plan and of those decrees, which 
were formed and matured without knowledge, we will not stop to exam- 
ine, for the idea borders too closely upon the ludicrous, to be dwelt upon 
in a serious discourse. And yet I cannot see how this conclusion can 
be avoided, reasoning from such premises." 

The "premises" are, that God fore-knew all things from eternity; 
and that his fore-knowledge must be founded upon decrees. The 
conclusion which Dr. F. 'cannot see how to avoid' is, that "the 
decrees of God must be passed, and his plan contrived independently 
of his knowledge''' — How Dr. F., with all his shrewdness, can avoid 
seeing how to avoid this conclusion, "we will not stop to examine, 
for the idea borders too closely upon the ludicrous, to be dwelt upon 



10 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

in a serious" review. "It seems to us," as well as the Dr. perfectly 

"consistent, to consider that, in the order of cause and effect, the exer- 
cise of the divine attributes is consequent upon their existence ; and 
that the plan of the Almighty is the result of his infinite knowledge; 
and that the decrees of his throne flow forth from the eternal fountain of 
his wisdom. This idea, moreover, accords with the scripture — "For 
whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate, to be conformed to the 
image of his son." " Elect according to the fore-knowledge of God the 
Father." Dr. F. says, "In these passages predestination and the decree 
of election, are most clearly founded on fore-knowledge. This, there- 
fore, must settle the question. God fore-knows in order to predestinate ; 
but he does not predestinate in order to fore-know." 

Fore-knowledge is not always used in one and the same sense. 
It sometimes reiers to the nature of future events, and sometimes 
to their actual existence. God fore-knows future events in both 
these senses. He fore-knows what events will be for the best on 
the whole, and He fore-knows what events will actually come to 
pass. In the first sense, the Divine fore-knowledge means the same 
as the dictates of Divine wisdom. In this sense, it is freely admit- 
ted, that the divine decrees are founded in the divine fore-knowl- 
edge. He fore-knew from eternity what events would be for the 
best, and determined that they should come to pass ; and thus He 
fore-knew their actual existence. In the first sense, the fore-knowl- 
edge of God is the foundation of his decrees, and in the last sense 
it is founded on his decrees. Fore-knowledge is doubtless to be 
understood in the first sense explained, in the passages which have 
just been quoted. It may be said consistently with truth and fact, 
that "those whom God fore-knew it would be best to predestinate; 
them he did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son." 
It is also in the same sense, that the elect are "elect according to 
the fore-knowledge of God the Father." God fore-knew it would be 
best to elect them, and therefore actually did elect them according 
to this fore-knowledge of what was wisest and best. But this is 
not the sense in which Dr. F. means to be understood. For as he 
means to destroy the argument of the Calvinists, he must of course 
intend to be understood as insisting that the Divine decrees are 
founded on that kind of fore-knowledge which respects not the 
nature merely, but the actual existence of future events. But that 
the Divine fore-knowledge in this last sense, is antecedent to the 
Divine decrees and the foundation of them is palpably absurd. The 
absurdity of Dr. F's theory can be easily illustrated by examples. 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. ll 

God fore-knew that the world would exist: and therefore deter- 
mined that it should exist. He fore-knew that Paul would be con- 
verted ; and therefore determined that he should be converted. He 
fore knew that Peter would be saved, and therefore determined that 
ho should be saved. He fore-knew that the dead would rise, and 
therefore determined that they shoved rise. He fore-knew that there 
would be a day of judgment, and therefore determined that there 
should be, According to Dr. F. God's fore-knowledge of the ex- 
istence of the world was antecedent to his will, or decree and the 
foundation of it. God fore-knew that the world would exist before 
He intended it should exist. He would therefore have fore-known 
the existence of the world, even if He had never willed its exist- 
ence. Dr. F. it will be recollected, p. 4, has defined predestination 
to be " an efficient predetermination to bring about or accomplish 
any future event." But wherein consists the "efficiency of a de- 
termination to bring about or accomplish future events which it is 
previously fore-known will come to pass independently of those 
determinations ? 

Will Dr. F. admit, that there are any future events, whatever, 
which depend upon the Divine will? If there are any such future 
events as depend on the Divine will, is it not a contradiction to 
say, that the Deity can fore-know those events before He knows his 
own will respecting them, and even before He has any will respec- 
ting them? If the existence of the world, for instance, depended 
on the will of God ; how could He know that the world would come 
into existence, before He knew that it was his intention to bring it 
into existence ; and even before any such intention existed in his 
own mind ? 

"But (the Dr. says) foreknowledge is pressed into this argument iri 
another form. "The foreknowledge of God," it is said, "is tantamount 
to a decree, because, inasmuch as God cannot be in a mistake, whatever 
he foreknows must take place — his knowledge makes it certain." This 
is indeed shifting the argument; for if God's knowledge makes an event 
certain, of course it is not his predetermination. But according to this 
notion, every thing contained in the idea of predestination is implied 
in foreknowledge, which is only throwing the subject back, on the ground 
first glanced at, that knowledge and decree are both one, which is ob- 
viously absurd. Besides, such an idea would make the scriptures that 
represent God's foreknowledge as distinct from his decree and antece- 
dent to it, worse than unmeaning. " Whom he did foreknow, them he 
did predestinate," would mean, "whom he did predestinate, them he did 
predestinate" — and, "elect according to the foreknowledge of God," 



12 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

would only mean, "that the decree of election, was according to the de- 
cree of election !" The absurdity of which is too apparent to need com- 
ment. And it may be urged further, in reply to this argument, that knowl- 
edge or foreknowledge cannot in the nature of things, have the least pos- 
sible influence, in making an event certain. It is not at all difficult to 
conceive how the certainty of an event can beget knowledge; but if any 
one thinks that knowledge is the cause of certainty, let him show it — to 
me such a connection is inconceivable. Whatever God foreknows or 
foresees, will undoubtedly come to pass. But the simple question is, 
does the event take place because it is foreknown, or is it foreknown, 
because it will take place? Or in other words, does God know an event 
to be certain because* it is certain, or does his knowing it to be certain 
make it certain ? The question thus stated, at once suggests the true 
answer ; for he would be considered a fool or a madman, who should 
seriously assert, that, a knowledge of a certainty produced that certain- 
ty. According to that, a certainty must exist, in order to be foreknown ; 
and it must ba foreknown, in order to exist ! From all which it appears, 
that fore-knowledge can have no influence in making a future event 
certain." 

But Dr. F. might have spared himself the trouble of refuting an 
error which no well informed Calvinists ever embraced. Calvinists 
do not mean that the Divine fore-knowledge makes future events 
certain, according to the literal import of that word. If they ever 
use the word " makes" in this connection, they use it in a figurative 
and restricted sense. All they mean is, that the Divine fore- 
knowledge proves future events certain. And this is really the 
case. It is impossible that God should fore-know that future events 
will come to pass unless it is infallibly certain that they will come 
to pass. This, Dr. F. himself admits. For he says, 

"Whatever God foreknows or foresees, will undoubtedly come to 
pass. But the simple question is, does the event take place, because it 
is fore-known, or is it fore-known because it will take place ? Or in 
other words, does God know an event to be certain because it is cer- 
tain, or does his knowing it to be certain make it certain?" 

Dr. F. justly observes, 

"The question thus stated suggests the true answer; for he would be 
considered a fool, or a madman, who should seriously assert, that a 
knowledge of a certainty produced that certainty." 

It is here admitted and proved by Dr. F. that Divine fore-knowl- 
edge demonstrates the certainty of future events, and that it de- 
pends upon that certainty. Dr. F. deserves the thanks of Calvinists 
not only for conceding this important point, but for placing it in a 
light so clear and convincing. I said, the Dr. deserved their thanks, 
because I am unwilling to suspect that the Dr. ' meant not so, 
neither did his heart think so.' 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 13 

But if all things were fore-known, and therefore certain from 
eternity, as Dr. F. admits, the question very naturally arises, what 
made them certain? Did chance or contingency make them cer- 
tain? Dr. F. has not yet proved, that there is any such thing as 
chance or contingency ; and I venture to deny that there is any 
such thing in existence. If there were any such thing as chance 
or contingency it could not render things certain. For uncertainty 
enters into the very idea of it. It could not, therefore, be the 
ground of the Divine fore-knowledge : but on the other hand, it 
must render the very idea of fore-knowledge contradictory and 
absurd/ 

Were future events rendered certain from eternity by any other 
being besides God? Certainly not. No being can operate as a 
cause before its own existence. God is the only being in the uni- 
verse who existed from eternity. And therefore no other being 
could have rendered it certain from eternity that any future events 
whatever would infallibly come to pass. Could the Divine perfec- 
tions render future events certain, independently of the Divine 
will ? No. The perfections of God cannot secure the existence of 
any future events whatever, either against his will or independently 
of his will. God brings nothing to pass from mere physical neces- 
sity. Whatever He does, He does of choice. Had God never 
willed the existence of the heavens and earth, the present system of 
events could not have gone into operation. It is plain, then, that 
this certainty of all future events from eternity, depended upon no 
cause out of the Divine Being; and that it could have depended 
upon no cause within the Divine Being, aside from the counsels of 
his will. If the certainty of all future events depended upon any 
cause whatever, then it depended upon the Divine will ; and it 
thereby demonstrates the universal and eternal decrees of God. 
Will the Dr. say, then, that this certainty depends on nothing ? It 
is in vain for him to say, that it now depends on secondary causes. 
For the question is, on what did this known certainty depend be- 
fore there were any secondary causes in existence? Will Dr. F. 
say that before secondary causes existed, this previous certainty 
which was infallibly known to God, did not depend on any thing? 
If so, what is the difference between Dr. F's. theory on this sub- 
ject, and Fatalism ? Fatalism teaches, that all things were certain 

2 



14 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. , 

from eternity, but that this certainty does not depend upon the 
Divine will, nor upon the Divine existence, nor upon any cause 
whatever. Dr. F. thinks, p. r 14, that ( Fatalism is nearly allied to 
Calvinian predestination' ! But if Dr. F. means to maintain, that 
this previous and eternal certainty of future events, did not depend 
on the Divine will, then his theory on this subject, is not merely 
" allied" to Fatalism, but is the very essence and quintessence of it. 
. Dr. F. therefore, it is hoped, will pause, and seriously reflect. For 
" the doctrine of Fate," he has said himself, "is the element in 
which infidelity lives, and moves, and has its being.'' 

— o@^— 

NUMBER IIL 

So far as Dr. Fisk is concerned, I might perhaps dismiss that 
part of his discourse which relates to the Divine fore-knowledge. 
But for the sake of my Methodist brethren, I must take notice of 
three subterfuges with which they have been provided by a more 
popular, perhaps a more learned, but in my opinion a less able de- 
fender of their faith. I mean Dr. Adam Clarke. One of Dr. 
Clarke's subterfuges is, that future events are not all fore-known 
by God, in the same sense. He says, that some future events are 
certain, and others contingent : and he explains the Divine fore-* 
knowledge according to this distinction. He thinks, that God fore- 
knows those future events which are certain, as certain; and those 
future events which are uncertain or contingent, as uncertain, or 
contingent. Here Dr. Clarke has committed himself in two im- 
portant particulars. In the first place, he has begged the main 
point in dispute : That there are future events, which are absolutely 
uncertain or contingent. .And in the second place, he aban- 
dons the ground which he professes to hold in common with his 
opponents : That God certainly fore-knows whatever comes to pass. 
I venture to deny, that there are any future events which are abso- 
lutely uncertain, or contingent, and challenge the proof. Dr. 
Clarke's disciples cannot prove it, without demonstrating, that it is 
neither true nor false, that some future events will take place. If 
they admit it to be true, that future events will take place, they 
thereby acknowledge, that the existence of those events is abso- 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 15 

lutely certain. If they say that it is false, that those future events 
will take place, they thereby affirm, that those future events are not 
future ; and that the non-existence of those future events is ab- 
solutely certain. If, therefore, they admit, that it is either true or 
false, that future events will take place, they must acknowledge 
that there is no absolute uncertainty or contingency respecting 
them. It consequently devolves on those, who have /taken 
refuge in Dr. Clarke's theory of absolute contingency and un- 
certainty, to affirm and prove that it is neither true nor false, that 
some future events will take place. Whether the Methodists in 
general will venture upon the affirmation, or undertake the demon- 
stration, till some new champion in the spirit and power of Dr. 
Clarke shall lead the way, it is not my province to determine. 

But, as has been already observed, Dr. Clarke, in his theory of 
contingency, abandons the ground which he professes to hold in 
common with his opponents : That God certainly fort-knows ivhat- 
soever comes to pass. To say, that there are some events which 
are uncertain or contingent, in the view of God, and that He fore- " 
knows them as such, is the same as to say that there are some events 
which in the eye of God are matters of uncertain conjecture ; that, 
in respect to their taking place, they are absolutely unknowable, 
and fore-known only as impossible to be fore-known. In these 
contingent events, Dr. Clarke, and Arminians generally, include 
all the voluntary actions of creatures. According to the above 
theory, therefore, God does not certainly fore-know the future con- 
duct of his creatures. Their future exercises and actions are al- 
together contingent and uncertain in his view. It is to the Divine 
mind, a matter of doubt and absolute uncertainty, how any of his 
creatures will act in time to come. It devolves on the advocates of 
this hazardous position, to show how God could certainly and in- 
fallibly foretell events, which, by reason of their contingency, He 
could not know would certainly and infallibly take place. It be- 
longs to them to reconcile that ignorance of futurity which their 
theory ascribes to Omniscience, with the acknowledged perfections 
of Jehovah, and the infallible declarations, promises and predictions 
of his Holy Word. 

But, Dr. Clarke, it seems, was not perfectly satisfied with this 
subterfuge, and therefore he invented another. He made the dis s 



16 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

covery, that the Divine Omniscience is not the knowledge of all 
things, but the power of knowing them ; and that the Divine fore- 
knowledge of all future events, is only a power to fore-know their 
existence, and therefore, does not imply that all future events are 
actually fore-known. He thinks that Omniscience no more implies 
that God knows all things which he has power to know, than 
Omnipotence implies that God does all things wh^ch he has power 
to do. But it may be said that God might have been, and that He 
once was Omnipotent, without doing any thing which He had power 
to do. He was Omnipotent from eternity, but all his works began in 
time. If the Omniscience of God as well as his Omnipotence be 
resolved into mere power, it would not only follow, that God might 
be Omniscient without knowing every thing, but that he might be 
Omniscient, without knowing any thing. But we have the same 
right to resolve all the perfections of the Deity into mere power, that 
we have to resolve his Omniscience into this attribute. It might 
be said, for instance, with as much appearance of truth, that the 
infinite goodness of God does not imply that He is actually good, 
nor his infinite wisdom, that He is actually wise ; nor his Omni- 
presence, that He is actually in all places of the universe ; but that 
these perfections merely imply, that God has power to be good, and 
wise, and ^very where present. Besides, this subterfuge of Dr. 
Clarke subverts his former subterfuge. For if God is Omniscient, 
and his Omniscience is a power to know all things, then all things 
are knowable; and there are no such events in existence, as are abso- 
lutely uncertain or contingent. It is absurd to suppose that God 
could have the power to fore-know all future events, if there were an 
absolute uncertainty or contingency in any of them. For the very 
idea of such uncertainty or contingency in future events, implies an 
impossibility of their being fore-known. 

There is reason to apprehend that Dr. Clarke and Arminians 
generally, have not been perfectly satisfied with either of the two 
subterfuges which I have just examined. For, lest these should 
fail, they have contrived a third. They affirm, that strictly speak- 
ing, there is no such thing as fore-knowledge or after-knowledge 
with God : but that He is one eternal now. This subterfuge, how- 
ever, shall be considered in my next number. 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 17 

NUMBER IV. 

The sentiment was maintained by Dr. Adam Clarke, and is still 
maintained by many others, that there is no such thing as duration 
with respect to the Divine Being. They contend there is no such 
thinor, strictly speaking, as either fore-knowledge or after-knowledge 
with God : that He is one eternal now. The argument by which 
they attempt to support this position, is briefly as follows : that there 
is no succession of exercises in the mind of God ; and, therefore, 
there can be no duration with respect to Him. But neither the 
principle assumed, nor the conclusion drawn from it, will bear ex- 
amination. In this argument there are two things taken for grants 
ed, which are not true. In the first place, it is taken for granted, 
that duration necessarily implies succession. But this is not the 
case. Succession does, indeed, necessarily imply duration, but du- 
ration does not necessarily imply succession. Let us select, for ex- 
ample, an elementary particle of matter. It is easy to see, that the 
duration of this particle does not depend upon a succession of chan- 
ges in it ; nor does its duration imply any such succession. Though 
there is no succession of changes in it, yet it is still the subject of 
duration. The elementary particles composing the material uni- 
verse, have undergone no material alteration since the creation of 
the world. It is true, they have been subject to a variety of mo- 
tions and combinations. But these motions and alterations are by 
no means essential properties. They are merely incidental and ar- 
bitrary, depending entirely on the will of the deity. Had God 
pleased, He might easily have preserved all these elementary parti- 
cles, both in a state of separation, and in a state of rest. And if He 
had done this, it is plain, that this circumstance could not have in- 
creased, nor diminished, nor annihilated their duration. It would 
still have been proper to ascribe to them time past, time present, 
and time future. Their duration is not incidental ; it belongs to 
their very essence : and in respect to their essence, they are ident- 
ically the same now, that they were when they were brought into 
existence. Duration is likewise applicable to the essence of the hu- 
man soul, in which there is no change ; but which always contin- 
ues identically the same. Duration, then, does not necessarily im- 
ply succession. And therefore if it should be admitted, that there 

2* 



18 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

is no succession in the mind of God, still it would not follow, that 
there is no such thing as duration in respect to Him. 

But we are told that there can be no such thing as duration with 
respect to the divine Being, because He is eternal. This argument 
takes it for granted, that eternity precludes the idea of duration. 
But the truth is, duration enters into the very idea of eternity. The 
eternity of God implies, that He always has existed, and that he al- 
ways will exist. The very meaning of eternity, is duration without 
end. Eternity is so far from implying, that there is no such thing 
as past duration, that it implies a past duration to which there was 
no beginning. And it is so far from implying that there is no such 
thing as future duration, that it implies a future duration which will 
never end. Eternal duration is perfectly intelligible. We can eas- 
ily conceive of an eternity which is past, and of an eternity to come. 
But what is meant by an eternity in which there is no duration? 
An eternity which implies neither the past nor the future ? An 
eternal now ? To exclude the past and the future from eternity, is 
to make it consist in the present moment. An eternal now is an 
eternal moment. If eternity precludes both the past and the future, 
and includes only the present, then, though a being should begin 
and terminate his existence the same instant, he might still be cal- 
led eternal. On this ground it will follow, that creatures are eter- 
nal every moment, and there are as many eternities as there are 
moments. I venture to say that an "eternal now" or an eternity in 
which there is no duration is a very short eternity. 

It will be asked perhaps, if there is any propriety in saying, that 
God is older now, than he was, when he created the world. I an- 
swer, there is not. Nor does the eternity of God, as consisting, in 
duration without beginning and without end, imply any such ab- 
surdity. It necessarily implies the contrary. The terms old and 
young imply a beginning of existence; and therefore they are alto- 
gether inapplicable to a beginningless duration. 

But I have not yet done with the argument which takes it for 
granted, that there is no succession of exercises in the mind of 
God, and thence infers, that there is no duration with respect to 
Him. It has been shown already, that the conclusion is not le- 
gitimately drawn from the principle assumed, even admitting it to 
be true. I am now prepared to examine the principle itself, which 



ARMINIANISxM EXAMINED. 19 

asserts that there is no succession of exercises in the divine mind. 

If there be no succesion of volitions in the divine mind ; then that 
volition which created the world, always was exerted, is now exert- 
ed, and always will be exerted. But it is impossible that an efficient 
volition of the divine Being should be exerted, without producing 
its effect. If that volition which created the world always was ex- 
erted, then the world was always created. If God is now exerting 
that volition, and always will be exerting it, then he is now creating 
the world, and always will be creating it. 

If there be no succession of volitions in the mind of God ; then 
that divine volition which will destroy the world, always has been 
exerted, is. now exerted, and always will be exerted. And hence 
it follows, that this divine volition always has destroyed the world, 
$s now destroying it, and always will be destroying it. 

Again : If there be no succession of exercises in the divine mind ; 
then that volition which created the world, and that which will de- 
stroy it, are one and the same, from eternity to eternity ; and there- 
fore, the world always was created and destroyed, is now created 
and destroyed, and always will be created and destroyed at one and 
the same time. 

If there be no succession of exercises in the divine mind, then 
God has the same feelings towards the fallen angels noiv, that he 
had before they fell from their first estate ; and the same feelings to- 
wards sinners, after they become saints, that he had before their 
conversion. 

Perhaps some opponent will say, however, that those divine vo- 
litions which produce external effects, are successive, but the divine 
determinations are eternal. But it may be replied, that this is giv- 
ing up the point in dispute. If there be any succession of exercises 
in the divine mind, then there must be such a thing as duration 
with respect to God. For although duration does not necessarily 
imply succession, yet succession does necessarily imply duration. 

It is said that a succession, or series of exercises in the divine 
mind, implies a beginning to them ; or a period when the ,divine 
being was entirely destitute of them. But I answer, we can as eas- 
ily conceive of eternal motion, as of eternal rest : of eternal mental 
exertion, as of eternal mental inactivity. And to my mind eternal 
mental exertion is much more conceivable, than eternal mental in- 



20 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

activity. In creatures a series of exercises has commenced which 
will never terminate. But there is no more absurdity in a series 
which had no beginning, than in a series which will never end. 

It maybe said, that if the divine exercises are successive, then 
every one of the divine exercises has had a beginning; and what 
is true of every exercise in this series individually considered, must 
be true of the whole series collectively considered. And therefore 
since every exercise in this series must have had a beginning ; the 
whole series must have had a beginning; and, consequently, a suc- 
cession of exercises in the divine mind, implies, that a period once 
was, when the divine being was entirely devoid of exercises. 

Answer. This objection, though plausible, is sophistical. If it 
proves any thing, it will prove too much. If it proves, that there 
cannot be a series which has no beginning, it will prove in the 
same way, that there cannot be a series which will never end. The 
reasoning is just as applicable in the one case, as in the other. The 
objector might attempt to show in the same way, that the series of 
exercises which has begun in the human soul cannot continue for- 
ever, but must necessarily have an end. ^e might reason thus : — 
' Every exercise in the series of human exercises must have an end. 
But 'what is true of every exercise in this series, individually consid- 
ered, must he true also of the whole series collectively considered : and 
therefore the whole scries must have an end. Consequently the peri- 
od ?nust come, when the human soul will he entirely devoid of exercis- 
es. 7 This reasoning seems plausible ; but who does not see that it 
must be sophistical and unsound ? 

The objector, likewise, might argue in the same way, that there 
are bounds to space. He might reason thus : ' Every portion of 
space is hounded. But what is true of every portion separately and 
individually considered, must he true of all those portions collective- 
ly considered. And, therefore, all space is hounded; or there are 
certain hounds, beyond which, there is no space whatever. This rea- 
soning is similar to the objecior's reasoning with respect to the ex- 
ercises of the Divine mind, and is just as plausible. But who does 
not see, that it must be a sophism, whether he can answer it or not 1 
The fallacy of the above reasoning, consists in the misapplication 
and abuse of terms. The term whole is not applicable to infinity, 
but only to what is finite. In using the phrase whole series, the ob- 






ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 21 

jector virtually makes the series he is speaking of, a finite series^ 
before he infers that it is so. He virtually takes for granted the 
very thing to be proved. Besides, there is another fallacy in the 
argument, which consists in using the same word in different sen- 
ses. Thus when it is said, with respect to a series of exercises in 
the Divine mind, that every exercise in this series must have a be- 
ginning, the term beginning is not to be understood numerically. 
It has no relation to number or succession, whatever. But when it 
is inferred that the series has a beginning, this same term is used in 
a very different sense. It relates to number and succession. It 
means that there is an exercise in the series which is the first of 
all. It is true, that every exercise in the series, begins to exist. 
But this does not imply that every exercise in the series begins the 
series ; nor that there is one exercise in the series which begins it, 
The fact, therefore, that every exercise in this series has a begin- 
ning in itself, without any relation either to number or succession, 
does not certainly imply that the series has a beginning with rela- 
tion to number and succession. Although every exercise begins to 
exist; still the exercises in the series may be innumerable : the se- 
ries, numerically speaking, may be without bcgin?ining } and without 
end. 

Again : It is said, that whatever begins to exist, must be an ef- 
fect and have a cause. Unless this be admitted, it is thought it 
will be impossible to prove, that any thing whatever is an effect ; 
and consequently, that even the existence of God cannot be proved 
from the things which are made. Hence it is inferred, that, if the 
Divine exercises are successive, they must be effects and have an 
antecedent cause. But a beginningless series of effects resulting 
from a previous cause, is a plain absurdity. 

Answer. It is freely admitted, that a beginningless series of ef- 
fects, resulting from a previous cause, is plainly absurd. It is also 
admitted, that whatever begins to exist out of & self-existent being 
must be an effect, and have a cause. But it is not admitted, that 
whatever begins to exist, within a? self-existent being, must be an 
effect, and have a cause. No being in the universe, besides God, 
is self-existent. The imperfecton of all other beings is decisive evi- 
dence, that they are not self-existent, but dependent. And since 
they do not exist by the necessity of their nature, they cannot move 



22 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. • 

and act by any such necessity. Their existence, and consequently 
all their motions and actions are effects, and must have a cause ade- 
quate to their production. But it is not so with the Divine Being. 
There is no imperfection in him, and, therefore, nothing incompat- 
ible with self-existence. He is absolutely perfect ; and an absolute- 
ly perfect being must be independent in his existence ; he must ex- 
ist by the necessity of his own nature. There is something in the 
nature of the divine Being, which renders his existence necessary ; 
and that necessity which lies at the foundation of his existence^ must 
lie equally at the foundation of his affections and exercises. A suc- 
cession of exercises in the Divine Being, therefore, does by no means 
imply the absurdity, that He causes them himself; but only that 
He chooses and acts by necessity, just as He exists. Nor does a 
necessity of exercises in God, imply any such necessity of exercises 
in his creatures. They have not the properties of necessary exist- 
ence. And as they do not even exist by the necessity of their na- 
ture, it is impossible, that they should move and act by any such ne- 
cessity. • 

Again : It is objected that a succession of exercises in the Divine 
mind, implies that'Godis mutable. 

Answer. There is a plain distinction between such a mutability 
as implies imperfection, and such a mutability as does not imply any 
imperfection. Now a succession of exercises in the mind of God, 
does not imply that he is mutable in his existence, nor that he is 
mutable in his attributes ; nor that he is mutable in his purposes. 
And therefore it does not imply any such mutability as involves the 
least degree of imperfection. It implies nothing inconsistent with 
that kind of immutability which the Scriptures ascribe to God as a 
perfection of his nature. In short, it implies nothing inconsist- 
ent with the most just and scriptural views of an infinitely perfect 
Being. 

The representations of Scripture concerning God clearly imply, 
that there is a succession of exercises in the Divine mind. Accord- 
ing to Scripture, God looked with complacency upon all his works, 
before sin entered into the world, and pronounced them very good. 
But after the fall, man lost the complacency of his maker, and be- 
came the object of his disgust. " It [then] repented the Lord that 
he had made man, and it grieved him at his heart." Although this 



ARM1NIANISM EXAMINED. 23 

Scripture expression does not denote any change of character, or 
purpose in the Divine Being, yet it does denote such a change of 
feeling in the mind of God, towards man, as his change from a ho- 
ly to a sinful character required. God never regretted all things 
considered, that he had made man ; yet, after all flesh had corrupt- 
ed their way upon the earth, it was to God in itself considered a just 
matter of regret, and sorrow and grief, that he had given man ex- 
istence. I here make the distinction between what is undesirable in 
itself, and desirable on the whole, because, without this distinc- 
tion, it is impossible to give a correct, or even a plausible interpre- 
tation of the passage which has been quoted. To God is ascribed 
grief in other places of Scripture. " How shall I give thee up 
Ephraim ? how shall I deliver thee Israel ? how shall I make thee 
as Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? My heart is turned 
within me, my repentings are kindled together." According to 
Scripture, God exercises very different feelings towards sinners be- 
fore their conversion from what he exercises towards them after 
their conversion. "God is angry witlfthe wicked every day." But 
after sinners become converted unto God, they are no longer the 
objects of his unmingled abhorrence, but the objects of his compla- 
cency and delight. As soon as they learn the fear of the Lord, 
" the Lord taketh pleasure in .them that fear him." Such various 
affections in the mind of God, corresponding to the natures, rela- 
tions, and changes of things, imply that his heart is not one, indi- 
visible and eternal exercise ; but that he has a variety and succession 
of holy exercises. 

The Scripture speaks of God in the past, present, and future ten- 
ses. It teaches us, for instance, that God did create the world in 
the beginning ; that he is now upholding and governing the world ; 
and that he will judge the world at the last day. Nor is there any 
good reason to believe that such Scripture representations are mere 
accommodations to the understanding and language of men, and 
not to be understood according to their literal and obvious import. 
For Scriptnre and reason unite to prove, that past, presenUand fu- 
ture duration is no less applicable to the divine Being, than to his 
creatures. But enough has been said to expose the absurdity of 
the supposition, that " God is one eternal how "; and that there is 
no such thing as /broknowledge in respect to him. Doubtless the 



24 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

Scriptures are perfectly and literally correct in ascribing " fore- 
knowledge to god," Dr. Adam Clarke and his followers to the con- 
trary, notwithstanding. 

I hope my Methodist brethren will excuse my apparent digres» 
sion in this and the preceding number, when I assure them, that it 
was intended for their benefit I expected they would think it ne- 
cessary to call in Dr. Clarke to help Dr. Fisk maintain his ground. 
And I thought it was incumbent on me, to save them and Dr. 
Clarke that needless trouble. 

I intend in my next number, to pay the most strict attention to 
Dr. Fisk. 



NUMBER V. 

I have already considered Dr. Fisk's professed refutation of the 
Calvinistic argument, founded on the divine fore-knowledge, and 
also three subterfuges of Dr. Adam Clarke. One of these subter- 
fuges is, That the Divine fore-knowledge consists partly in conjec- 
ture. Another is, That the Divine fore-knowledge consists merely 
in the power of fore-knowing. And the third is, That there is no 
such thing as Divine fore-knowledge; or, That "God is one eternal 
now." The last of these subterfuges I':suspect Dr. Fisk had in 
view, as a last resort, in the sentence which closes his remarks up- 
on the second Calvinistic argument which he considers. The sen- 
tence is as follows : [p. 8.] " As he is in every point of wide im- 
mensity, so .he is in every moment of long eternity." To say that 
"God is in every moment of long eternity," confounds the distinc- 
tion between past, present and future duration, and implies, that 
" God is one eternal now." But this subterfuge was fully exposed 
in my last number. The Divine FORE-knowledge, therefore, must 
not be treated in this discussion as a nonentity, but as a solid reali- 
ty. Dr. Fisk denies, that the Divine fore-knowledge is founded up- 
on the Divine decrees. On the contrary, he contends, that the de- 
crees of God are founded upon his fore-knowledge. The Doctor 
himself allows, that there are some future events which God has de- 
creed. And this is the same as to admit, that there are some future 
events which never would take place, if God had not decreed them. 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 25 

And yet, according to Dr. Fisk, God's fore-knowledge even of 
those events which depend upon his decrees, does not prove those 
decrees. He contends that God fore-knew those events before he 
decreed them. That is, He fore-knew those events which could not 
take place without his decrees, before those decrees were formed. 
He fore-knew they would take place, before he knew the reason 
WHY they would take place ; and even before there was any such 
reason. To say that his fore- knowledge of those events does not 
prove them to have been decreed, implies that He might have fore- 
known them, if they never had been decreed; although they could 
not take place without being decreed. Such is the palpable absurd- 
ity of Dr. Fisk's mode of reasoning on this subject. 

Perhaps, however, the Doctor for the sake of avoiding this ab- 
SHrdity, would be willing to admit, that God's fore-knowledge of 
those events which depend upon his decrees, does itself depend upon 
them ; and that he cannot fore-know w T hat events will fulfil his de- 
crees, without first knowing that there are such decrees to be ful- 
filled. But this admission would spoil all his reasoning upon the 
subject. After making this admission, he could not even pretend, 
that fore-knowledge founded upon decrees " makes an essential attri- 
bute of Deity depend upon the exercise of his attributes." Or that 
it implies that " the decrees of God must be passed and his plan 
contrived independently of his knowledge." 

Besides : Nothing but the divine decrees could make any future 
events certain from eternity. Consequently, that certainty which is 
the object of the divine fore-knowledge, necessarily implies the di- 
vine decrees as its foundation. And, therefore, if the fore-know- 
ledge of God proves that he has decreed sonie events, it equally 
proves that he has decreed all events. But Dr. Fisk cannot, on 
his own ground, prove from the divine fore-knowledge, that God 
has decreed any thing whatever. Nor can he consistently main- 
tain, that God has decreed any events in the universe. For it is 
plainly absurd to talk of God's decreeing, that events should take 
place, when he previously fore-knew they would take place, inde- 
pendently of that decree. 

After the Doctor had completely subverted the divine decrees by 
his representation of the divine fore-knowledge, it was not strange 



26 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

that he should undertake to expunge the divine decrees from the 
divine plan. He proceeds, [p. 7.] 

2. But predestination is argued, from the necessity of a divine plan. — 
"It cannot be conceived," it is said, "that God would leave things at 
random and have no plan. But no alteration of his plan can take place, 
upon condition that his creatures act in this or that way." But this ar- 
gument is easily answered, at least for the present. For it assumes what 
ought to be proved, and what has not, to my knowledge, ever been prov- 
ed, viz": that, to deny Calvinian predestination, is to deny, that God has 
a perfect plan. We acknowledge and maintain that God has a plan, one 
part of which is, to govern his responsible subjects without controlling 
their will, hy a fixed decree — to punish the incorrigible, and save those 
who repent and believe. Does such a plan imply the necessity of a 
change, " on condition that his creatures act in this or that way ?" If in- 
deed it was necessary for God to decree an event, in order to fore-know 
it, this inference might be just. But as this is seen to be false, it follows 
that a perfect God, whose eye surveys immensity and eternity at a glance, 
and who, necessarily knows all possibilities and contingencies, all that is, 
or will be, can perfectly arrange his plan, and preclude the possibility of 
a disapp@intment, although he does not, by a decree of predestination, 
fix oil the volitions and acts of his subjects. Even in human govern- 
ments, where the rulers can have no knowledge of the individuals who 
will transgress, or of the nature and extent of the transgressions, the 
principles and plan of government undergo no change, to accommodate 
themselves to the contingent acts of the subjects. How absurd then to 
suppose, that the All wise Ruler of the Universe will be subject to dis- 
appointment, unless he predestinate the transgressions of sinners, and the 
obedience of his saints! The truth is, in my view, this idea detracts 
from the wisdom of God; for the perfection of his plan, as they maintain 
it, is predicated on the imperfection of his attributes. But our view of 
the divine plan accords well with our idea of his infinite nature. 

Here Doctor F. first undertakes to state the argument, and then 
attempts to refute it. The statement which he gives of the argu- 
ment is contained in the following words : " It cannot he conceived 
that God would leave things at random, and have no plan. But no al- 
teration of his plan can take place upon condition, that his creatures 
act in this or that way.'* 

But the Doctor has neither refuted this argument, nor fairly stat- 
ed it. In the first place, he has not refuted the argument even as 
he has stated it himself. What he calls " the argument " consists 
of two plain propositions, without any inference whatever. The 
first is, * That God would not leave things at random, and have no 
plan.' Now this proposition, it is admitted, is stated hy Dr. Fisk 
without proof. It is too plain to require proof. Dr. Fisk himself 
does not deny it. The second proposition contained in what Dr. 
Fisk calls " the argument" is, ' That no alteration of his plan can 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 27 

take place upon condition, that his creatures act in this or that way. 5 
This proposition likewise is assumed, according to the Doctor's 
statement. And it is so plain a truth, that Doctor F. does not 
presume to call it in question. Now these two plain truths are the 
only propositions assumed in the argument so far as the Doctor 
states it. If any thing else is " assumed," it is assumed in the in- 
ference which the Doctor feels himself obliged to draw from the two 
plain truths which he states as the substance of the argument. As 
Doctor F. has not told what inference he did draw from those two 
truths, I can only conjecture what that inference was. But I con- 
clude it must have been this, That God has fore-ordained whatso- 
ever comes to pass. Whether this was the precise inference which 
the Doctor drew from those truths or not ; he seems to think it in- 
cumbent on him to disprove it. He says, ["it assumes what ought 
to be proved, and what has not, to my knowledge, ever been prov- 
ed, viz : that to deny Calvinian predestination is to deny that God 
has a perfect plan. We acknowledge and maintain, that God has a 
plan, one part of which is, to govern his responsible subjects, with- 
out controlling their will, by a fixed decree — -to punish the incorrig- 
ible, and save those who repent and believe. Does such a plan im- 
ply the necessity of a change, " on condition that his creatures act 
in this or that way"?] The Dr, makes the following reply. " If 
indeed it was necessary for God to decree an event in order to fore- 
know it, this inference might be just. 5 ' But this is seen to be strict- 
ly true, the Doctor's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding. — 
For no event could be fore-known from eternity, unless it was al- 
ways certain. Nothing out of the divine Being existed from eter- 
nity to make it certain. And there was nothing within the divine 
Being which could make it certain, but the divine decree. It does 
not appear, therefore, that the above inference is unjust. And 
Doctor F. has not yet refuted the argument which he pretends to 
state. 

But, in the second place, the argument is not fairly stated. The 
Doctor seems to think, that the perfection of the divine plan con- 
sists solely in its immutability. But a perfect plan implies something 
more. 1st. It must propose the best possible end. 2dly. It must 
include the best possible means. 3dly. It must preclude from the 
system every thing which is useless and detrimental. 4thly. It 



28 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

must be immutable. Now infinite Goodness must seek the best 
end. Infinite wisdom must select the very best means for its ac- 
complishment, and preclude every event from the system which is 
either detrimental or unnecessary. And infinite Power cannot fail 
to execute the plan which infiuite Wisdom has devised, and infin- 
ite Goodness seeks to accomplish. The conclusion is irresistible : 
That God means to secure the greatest good ; and that the plan he 
has adopted, and which he is carrying into execution includes all 
those events which are necessary to the greatest good and precludes 
all other events. The Doctor's assertion, therefore, that ' the 
perfection of God's plan, as Calvinists maintain it, is predicated 
on the imperfection of his attributes,' is altogether gratuitous and 
unfounded. 

If Doctor F. could prove that God's plan might be unchangeable 
without fixing the character and conduct of his creatures, he could 
not thus prove the absolute perfection of such a plan. The Doctor 
himself says, that " Even in human governments, where the rulers 
can have no knowledge of the individuals who will transgress, or of 
the nature and extent of the transgressions, the principles and plan 
of government undergo no change, to accommodate themselves to 
the contingent acts of the subjects. 5 ' Now surely Dr. F. will not 
pretend, that any human government is perfect, notwithstanding the 
immutability which he ventures to ascribe to them. In the divine 
plan, therefore, immutability alone is not sufficient to constitute it 
perfect. The Doctor admits that the divine plan might not be un- 
changeable, on his principles, "if it was necessary for God to de-^ 
cree an event, in order to fore-know it." We have seen that this 
was necessary. And therefore the point which Doctor F. labored 
so hard to establish, he has not proved. But if he had proved it, it 
would not have affected the argument, founded on the necessity of 
an absolutely perfect plan of divine operation. 

The argument founded on " the necessity of a divine plan" may 
be presented in another light. The essential knowledge and wisdom 
of God, must place before him all possible events. His infinite 
goodness cannot possibly be indifferent to any of those events. He 
must have some choice respecting them all. Respecting every pos- 
sible event he must choose, either that it shall exist, or that it shall 
not. Those events which he chooses should exist, that choice must 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 29 

secure. And all those which he choses should not exist, that 
very choice must prevent. Consequently, all those events which do 
exist, were chosen from eternity. 

The Doctor says, it is God's plan " to punish the incorrigible, 
and save those who repent and believe." Now suppose a sinner 
should repent and believe to-day. According to Doctor F. it is 
God's present intention to save him. But I suppose the Doctor in 
common with the rest of my Methodist brethren, believes that such 
a man may yet fall from grace, and die an incorrigible sinner ; and 
that such instances have actually occurred. If it is the divine in- 
tention to save every one who repents and believes, could such in- 
stances of falling from grace occur, without changing the divine in- 
tentions towards those particular persons ? 

As Doctor F. professes to believe in the divine fore-knowledge, 
I should like to put a few more questions to him on this subject, if 
he would not consider it uncivil. Does the Doctor believe that 
God fore-knew that the fallen angels would sin and be forever mis- 
erable, before he brought them into existence? Did God fore- 
know that their existence would prove an everlasting curse to them- 
selves and to millions of the human race ? And did he in full vie w 
of these awful consaquences, choose to give existence to those spi- 
rits? Has he fore-known from eternity, that it would have been 
good for Judas, and all those who die in their sins, if they had nev- 
er been born ? Does he fore-know all this, and still choose to 
bring such individuals into existence ? Can the Dr. love such a 
God as this ? If so, Why can he not love a God who has ford-or- 
dained whatsoever comes to pass. 

— ^&&— 

NUMBER VI. 

I have already attempted to show, that the Calvinistic arguments 
founded on the divine fore-knowledge, and the perfection of the di- 
vine plan, are well founded ; the attempt of Dr. Fisk and others ta 
refute these arguments, notwithstanding. I shall now inquire, 
whether Dr. F. has proved the doctrine of predestination to be un- 
scriptural. 

3* 



30 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

"The Scriptures abound with passages which at once prove the doc- 
trine." 

Dr. Fisk says : 

"If this is true, then, indeed we must submit " ! ! 

It is devoutly to be wished, that the Doctor may not find it ne- 
cessary to" submit " to the truth, ' but rejoice in it as one that find- 
eth great spoil.' 

" But [says the Dr.] the question is, Where are these passages ? After 
such a strong assertion, it would probably appear surprising, to one un- 
acquainted with this subject, to learn, that there is not a single passage 
which teaches directly, that God hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes 
to pass. Yet this is the fact. If the doctrine is taught in scripture, it is 
in an indirect manner." 

Here I would observe, 

1. Dr. Fisk affirms, "that there is not a single passage which 
teaches directly, that God hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes to 
pass." I affirm that there is. The Dr. 's assertion is without proof. 
Mine, therefore, is as good as his. 

2. If Doctor F. means, that there is not a single passage which 
APPEARS to teach this doctrine directly ; then he might have 
spared himself the trouble of explaining away, p. 9, the following 
passage : 

" Who ivorkeih all things after the council of his oivn will." 
It were absurd for the Doctor to attempt to explain away a mean- 
ing which the passage did not even appear to have. 

3. If the Doctor's assertion were true, it would not justify the 
inference which the Doctor draws from it. He asserts, " that 
there is not a single passage which teaches directly, that God hath 
fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass." He infers, 

"If this doctrine is taught in Scripture it is in an indirect manner." 
This inference is not contained in the premises. The truth is, 
a doctrine may not be taught directly in a single passage separately 
considered ; and yet be taught directly in several passages collective- 
ly considered. For example, the Unitarian says, that there is not a 
single passage which teaches the doctrine of a Trinity in the God- 
head. His assertion is not, true. But if it were true, it would not 
prove, that this doctrine is not directly taught in the Word of God. 
One passage directly teaches that the Father is God ; another, that 
the Son is God; a third, that the Holy Ghost is God ; and a fourth, 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 31 

that " the Lord our God is one Lord." Although a Trinity in Unity 
is not directly taught in any one of these passages, taken separate- 
ly ; yet it- is directly taught in all those passages taken together. — 
Just so, with respeet to the doctrine of predestination. If it were 
not taught in any one passage, taken singly and separately, that 
God fore-ordains whatsoever comes to pass ; still it would by no means 
follow, that this doctrine is not directly and plainly taught in the 
Bible. 

" Nor will it follow [says Dr. Fisk] because God hath predestinated 
some things ; that he hath, therefore, decreed all things." 

I answer, the correctness of the inference, that God has decreed 
all things, from the fact, that he has decreed some things ; depends 
on the nature and connection of those things which he has decreed. 
Thus : If God has decreed the least things, such as the falling of a 
sparrow, and the number of our hairs, it is reasonable to believe, 
that he has decreed things which are greater. If he has decreed 
things which are of the least importance, he has doubtless decreed 
things which are of more importance. If he has decreed those things 
which pertain to the body ; He has doubtless decreed those which 
pertain to the soul. If it was necessary, that he should fore-ordain 
the events of the natural world ; it was much more necessary, that 
he should fore-ordain the events of the moral world. If it was im- 
portant, that God should determine the temporal destinies of men ; 
how much more important, that he should determine their eternal 
destinies. 

Besides : The events which take place under the divine govern- 
ment are connected with each other, as occasions and consequen- 
ces, second causes and effects. If God, therefore, has fore-ordained 
some of these events, there is reason to believe that he has fore-or- 
dained them all. It is impossible to conceive how God could de- 
termine one link, in a chain of events, without determining all those 
other links on which that trie depended. 

" All those passages, then, [says the Doctor,] which have been so fre- 
quently quoted as proof of this doctrine, which only go to prove, that 
God hath predetermined certain events, are not proof in point." 

The Dr. seems to take it for granted, that no passage of Scrip- 
ture proves more than it asserts. 

This is not true. Every passage proves more than it asserts. If 
a passage asserts the dependence of one man; it proves the depend- 



32 ARMINIAN1SM EXAMINED. 

enceof all men. If a passage asserts, that one moral act is decreed, 
it proves, that predestination is consistent with moral action, or mo- 
ral agency. If a passage asserts, that God has a supreme regard for 
his own glory ; it proves that he will secure the existence of every 
thing which tvill promote his glory, and prevent the existence of ev- 
ery thing which will not promote it. If a passage asserts that God 
is not indifferent to some events ; it proves, that he is not indifferent 
to any events but that he positively chooses either that they shall come 
into existence, or that they shall not. 

To ascend from particular instances to general conclusions, is 
called the method of induction. This mode of investigating truth, 
has been used with great success in the sciences ; and I see no rea- 
son why it is not as safe in morals as in physics. But Dr. Fisk 
strikes at the very foundation of this mode of investigation. Sup- 
pose the Dr. should undertake to prove now, that all men are 
mortal ; and should proceed on the ground that he assumes, That 
no passage proves any thing more than it asserts. On this ground 
he could not possibly prove, that all men are mortal, unless he could 
find a passage which asserts this truth in direct terms. Should the 
Doctor prove, that men always have been subject to mortality, it 
might be replied, on his ground, that this only proves that some men 
are mortal ; and, therefore, l is not proof in point.' Should he show, 
that men are continually dying in this world ; he might still be told, 
on his own principles, that, in this way, he makes no advance. His 
arguments go only to prove, that individuals are mortal, so far as he 
has opportunity to know; 'they are not, therefore, proof in point/ 
Should the Doctor o x uote passages of Scripture, which do not ex- 
pressly assert, thctt all mankind are mortal; he might be told, that, 
these passages, [on his ground,] are not proof in point.' Should 
the Doctor undertake to establish some general conclusion, and an 
opponent should treat his arguments in this style, I think it not un- 
likely, that the Doctor would complain of such treatment as disin- 
genuous and unfair. I do not wish, however, to impeach either 
the Dr.'s motives or understanding. And, therefore, I will leave 
him and the public, to make the application. 

In respect to predestination, however, every passage is in point, 
which proves what the opponents of this doctrine deny, or disproves 
what they affirm. Arminians deny that the decrees of God are con- 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 33 

i 

sistent with moral agency. Those passages, therefore, which teach 
that God hardened Pharaoh's heart, and then plagued and destroy- 
ed him for his obstinacy, are " proof in point." Arminians deny, 
that God has decreed the obedience of saints. All those passages, 
therefore, which teach, that i God has chosen them that they should 
be holy,' and 'predestinated them, that they should be conformed to 
the image of his Son' ; that ' he puts his Spirit within them, and 
causes them to walk in his statutes, and to keep his judgments and 
do them,' are "proof in point." Arminians deny that God has de- 
creed what persons shall repent and turn to Him. All those passa- 
ges, therefore, which teach, that the new birth, love, repentance and 
faith are the fruit of the spirit, the gift and the work of God, "who 
worketh all thing after the counsel of his own will," are "proof in 
point." Arminians contend, that as many as believe are in conse- 
quence of their faith, ordained to eternal life. All those passages, 
therefore, which reverse this order, and teach, that ' as many as were 
ordained to eternal life and believed,' are " proof in point." Armin- 
ians contend, that men have a self determining, independent power 
of acting. All those passages, therefore, which teach, that " it is 
not in him that walketh to direct his steps" ; that " we are not suf- 
ficient of ourselves, to think any thing as of ourselves ;" and that it 
is in ' God we live and move and have our being,' are " proof in 
point." Arminians deny, that God has decreed sin. Those pas- 
sages, therefore, which teach, ' that God made Sihon's spirit obsti- 
nate, moved David to number Israel, put a lying spirit in the mouth 
of Ahab's prophets, and put into the hearts of the kings of the earth 
to agree and give their kingdom unto the beast,' are " proof in 
point." Arminians, [p. 7.] 

"maintain that God has a plan, one part of which is to govern his re- 
sponsible subjects without controlling their will ;" 

that is to say, God governs mankind only by giving them up to the 
government of their own ungovernable will; and rewarding and pun- 
ishing them according to their ungovernable conduct. Those pas- 
sages, therefore, which teach, that ' the preparations of the heart in 
man, as well as the answer of the tongue, are from the Lord ; that 
even the king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of 
water, He turneth it whithersoever He will ; that creatures are in 
the hand of God as clay is in the hands of the potter ; and that of 



34 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things/ are "proof in 
point." 

Dr. F. says, p. 8 : 
"We know of many [passages] which say of certain events which have 
come to pass, that God did not command them nor will them" : 

and, therefore, he thinks that the abundant Scripture proof is all on 
the Arminian side of the question. But cannot Dr. F. see any dis- 
tinction between the commands of God and his decrees ? nor be- 
tween what He chooses in itself considered, and what He chooses 
on the whole? Can Dr. F. perceive no difference between God's 
commanding Pharaoh to let Israel go, and his decreeing that Pharaoh 
should not let them go?— Can He perceive no difference between 
God's unwillingness in itself, that Christ should die, and his choos- 
ing on the whole, to put him to grief, and make his soul an offering 
for sin ? These distinctions are too plain to be denied. And there- 
fore those passages which teach, that God has not commanded some 
things, do not prove that He has not decreed them. And those 
passages which teach, that God is unwilling, that some events should 
take place, which actually come to pass, will not answer the Dr.'s 
purpose. They must mean, either, that God is unwilling in itself 
considered, that these events should take place, or else that He is 
unwilling on the whole. If they mean only an unwillingness in it- 
self considered, they will not answer the Dr.'s purpose ; because, in 
this sense, they are perfectly consistent with the doctrine, that God 
has fore-ordaiiied whatsoever comes to pass. If they be understood 
to mean an unwillingness all things considered, they will not an- 
swer the Dr.'s purpose, even in this case. For, an unwillingness, 
all things considered, that events should take place, amounts to a 
decree, that they shall not take place. If the passages which the Dr. 
speaks of, be understood in this last sense, therefore, they would 
prove too much. They would prove that some events take place in 
spite of the determinations of Omnipotence, 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 35 



NUMBER VII. 



Dr. Fisk says, [p. 8.] 

"It is argued however, that certain acts of moral agents, even those 
acts for which they are held responsible, are, according- to the Scriptures, 
the results of God's predetermination, and therefore, it is reasonable to 
infer, that all are. This general conclusion however, is not contained in 
the premises." 

It is indeed a very summary way of disposing of an argument, to 
assert, without proving, that the conclusion is not contained in the 
premises. The Dr. virtually takes it for granted, that a general con- 
clusion cannot be legitimately drawn from particular instances. But 
is it so? If it were proved, that God has created one man; might 
it not be safely inferred, that God has created all men ? If it were 
proved, that one man is constantly and entirely dependent ; might it 
not be inferred, that all men are? The Dr. will probably say yes; 
and assign the following reason : that all men are altke in the essen- 
tial properties of their existence. Very well. The moral acts of 
creatures are all alike in respect to those properties which are es- 
sential to the existence of moral exercises. Does not the fact, then, 
that some moral exercises of saints and sinners are created, prove 
that all are? Does not the fact, that some of their moral exercises 
arise without a self-determining power of acting, prove that all do? 
Does not the fact, that some of their moral exercises are dependent 
for their existence, on the Divine will, prove that all are thus de- 
pendent? To say that God has decreed, in certain instances, what 
exercises shall be originated by a self-determining poicer is a palpa- 
ble absurdity. It amounts to saying, that in some instances, God 
determines a power, which can be determined only by itself. It is 
self-evident, that the power of acting in men, is necessary to every 
one of their actions. But the question is, Whether this power of 
acting is dependent, for its exertions, on the Divine will ; or wheth- 
er it is an independent, self-determining power. If the power of 
acting in men, is a self -moving apparatus, it must of course place 
all the actions of mankind beyond the reach of the Divine decrees. 
Consequently, if God has decreed some of their exercises, they have 
not in these instances a self-determining power o£ acting. The 
power of putting forth those acts which are fore-ordained, must cer- 



86 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

tainly be dependent for its exertions, on the Divine will. And if 
the power of putting forth these acts, is dependent, then there is no 
reason to believe, that men have a self-determining power of acting. 
For it is plainly absurd to suppose, that a man has two powers of 
acting ; one of which is self-moved, and the other dependent, in its 
exercises on the Divine will. Now the same arguments which dis- 
prove, that men have a self-determining power, imply, that they are 
dependent for all their exercises, on the Divine will ; and of course, 
that all their exercises are fore-ordained. 
Dr. F. admits that, [p. 8.] 

"If it can be proved from Scripture, that God holds his creatures 
responsible for the results of his own decrees — such Scripture proofs 
would be strong arguments to ward off the objections that are brought 
against this system." 

Dr. F. therefore, thinks it necessary for him to examine and ex- 
plain those Scriptures. And he begins with an examination of the 
following declaration of Joseph to his brethren : "As for you, ye 
thought evil against me, but God meant it for good." On this pas- 
sage the Dr. makes the following remarks. 

"Now (p. p. 8, 9.) without stopping here to inquire whether Joseph 
was inspired to utter this sentiment, we are ready to acknowledge, that 
there are a number of similar scriptures, which teach, that in the results 
of the wicked acts of wicked men, God had a design and a controlling 
influence, and thereby made them subservient to his own purposes. He 
hath wisdom and power "to make the wrath of men praise him, and to 
restrain the remainder of wrath." But does he, therefore, decree the 
wrath itself? And is this wrath necessary to the accomplishment of his 
purposes ? As well might it be said, that because a government, in 
quelling a rebellion, replenished its exchequer from the confiscated es- 
tates of the rebels, therefore that government decreed the rebellion, and 
was dependent upon it, for the prosperity of the nation. Let it be dis- 
tinctly understood then, that to overrule and control the results of an act, 
is altogether different from making the act itself the result of ^an over- 
ruling and controlling power." 

It seems then, the Dr. has concluded ' not to stop here, to inquire 
whether Joseph was inspired to utter this sentiment.' This lan- 
guage of the Dr. seems to imply that he considered it questionable 
whether Joseph was really inspired, but thought it unnecessary to 
the argument to disprove the inspiration of that holy man. T shall 
not stop here to inquire, whether Calvinists in general will be SUF- 
FICIENTLY grateful to Dr, F. for his condescension ; or whether 
they will be GUILTY of suspecting, that the Dr.'s condescension 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 37 

consisted in his inability to prosecute that investigation to his own 
advantage. Should my Methodist brethren, however, wish me to 
pursue the inquiry ^ which I have said I will not stop here to make, 
I will endeavor to gratify their wishes, as soon as they shall make 
them known. But yet I will stop here to inquire briefly into the 
inspiration of Joseph. And I would observe 1st. That Joseph was 
at least, sometimes inspired. He was inspired to interpret the dreams 
of the chief butler, and the chief baker. He was inspired to in- 
terpret the dream of Pharaoh. Pharaoh was convinced of his in- 
spiration, and told his servants, that they had found in Joseph, a 
man in whom was the Spirit of God. He was inspired to say unto 
his brethren, " God will surely visit you, and ye shall carry up my 
bones from hence." Again, 2dly. He spoke the language of in- 
spiration, when he told his brethren how long the famine should 
continue in the land : and it was in immediate connection with this 
prophetic declaration, that he first uttered the substance of the sen- 
timent contained in the text of Scripture which the Dr. quotes. 
u And he said, I am Joseph your brother, whom ye sold into Egypt. 
Now therefore, be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye 
sold me hither ; for God did send me before you to preserve life. 
For these two years, hath the famine been in the land: and yet ' 
there are five years, in the which there shall be neither earing nor 
.harvest.. And God sent me before you, to preserve you a posterity 
in the earth, and to save your lives by a great deliverance. So now 
it was not you that sent me hither but God." These passages and 
the one quoted by Dr. Fisk, were recorded not to deceive, but to 
instruct succeeding generations. I see no more reason to doubt the 
inspiration of Joseph in uttering these sentiments, than to doubt th« 
inspiration of the prophets, or of the apostles of our Lord, in utter- 
ing the sentiments which they publicly taught. 

Dr. Fisk would fain make Joseph say to his brethren nothing 
more than this : That God overruled the results of their wicked con- 
duct without determining their conduct itself . But if Joseph meant 
nothing more than this, w T hy did he not say so? Why did he use 
language so foreign from his meaning? If God had no design nor 
agency in their selling him into Egypt, why did he say thus to 
them ? "Benot grieved nor angry with yourselves that ye sold me 
hither : for God did send me before you to preserve life. — And God 

4 



66 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

sent me before you to preserve you a posterity in the earth.— So now 
it was not you that sent me hither, but God." Here Joseph asserts 
three times that God had sent him into Egypt. And what is this 
but saying, that God's hand and counsel were concerned in his being 
sent thither by his brethren ? 

But perhaps Dr. F. will say, that God decreed that Joseph should 
be sent into Egypt, but did not decree, that he should be sent thither 
by his brethren. This amounts to saying, that God decreed the end 
without decreeing the means; that is to say, He DECREED the 
end, but left it to CHANCE to ACCOMPLISH the end. 

It is written, ( The wrath of man shall praise thee ; the remain- 
der of wrath shalt thou restrain.' On this passage the Dr. inquires : 

" But does he therefore decree the wrath itself? And is this wrath 
necessary to the accomplishment of his purposes?" 

I answer, if God restrains all the wrath that will not praise him ; 
then He has all hearts in his hands. Consequently He was abun- 
dantly able to restrain and prevent all the siaand wrath which exist, 
if He had chosen to do this. If He prevents all the wrath which 
will not praise Him, without impairing the moral agency of his • 
creatures ; then He might if He had chosen, have prevented all the 
sin and wrath of his creatures, without destroying their moral agen- 
cy. The sin and wrath of his creatures, therefore, do not take 
place in opposition to his choice all things considered. 

The passage of Scripture last cited, proves 1st. That God is not 
indifferent to the wrath of his creatures ; or that He has some choice 
respecting the existence or non-existence of this wrath in every in- 
stance. It proves, 2dly. That God is able to prevent their wrath 
without impairing their moral agency, and does prevent it, so far as 
He sees best. And therefore it proves, 3dly. That no wrath can 
exist either without his choice or against his choice ; or, which is 
the same thing, that no more wrath can exist, than He chooses, all 
things- considered, should exist. But Dr. F. thinks, 

" It might as well be said, that-beeause a government in quelling a re- 
bellion, replenished its exchequer from the confiscated estates of the reb- 
els, therefore that government decreed the rebellion, and was dependent 
upon it, for the prosperity of the nation." 

But I answer, The cases are not parallel in those points on which 
the reasoning depends. To make the Dr.'s example a suitable illus- 
tiation of the government of God ; he must suppose a government 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 30 

which was able to prevent and does prevent every rebellion that will 
not redound to the good of the nation. Were this the case, it might 
be justly inferred, that no more rebellion existed in the government, 
than that government chose to suffer. 

The next passage which Dr. F. undertakes to explain is the fol- 
lowing : "The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea even the 
wicked for the day of evil." Here Dr. F. makes the following im- 
portant concession : 

" That the L6rd hath made all things for his own glory is a proposition 
easily understood, and doubted, I trust by none ; and this is evidently 
the meaning of the former member of the passage." 

But to say, that^he Lord hath made all things for his own glory, 
is the same as to say, that He intended all things for his own glory, 
when He made them. That is, all things have come into existence, 
agreeably to the Divine intentions, or purposes. Dr. F. therefore 
has virtually admitted, that the decrees of God extend to all the 
works of his hands. But perhaps Dr. F. means, that the decrees of 
God extend only to the existence of his creatures, and not to their 
motions and actions. If so, why does Dr. F. admit, that God has 
made all things for his own glory ? The end for which all things 
are made, refers to the use which is to be made of them. If God 
has made all things for his own glory ; then He intends, that all his 
creatures shall always subserve his glory, by all their motions and 
actions, characters, changes and conditions. And this implies, that 
the Divine decrees extend to whatsoever comes to pass. So much 
Dr. F. has virtually admitted is contained in the passage: "The 
Lord hath made all things for himself, yea even the wicked for the 
day of evil." Still Dr. F. says : 

"The latter clause, if it helps the cause for which it is quoted at all, 
must mean, that the Lord has predestinated men to be wicked, that he 
might make them miserable. But it is not necessary to make the text 
speak this shocking sentiment." 

I answer, Calvinists do not make it speak this shocking senti- 
ment. If the misery of the wicked were the ultimate end of their 
creation, it would not be true, that God had made them for his own 
glory. The truth is, God has not made the wicked either for the 
sake of their wickedness or for the sake of their misery, as an ulti- 
mate end. He has predestinated the wicked unto sin and misery 
not for the sake of both sin and misery, nor for the sake of either ; 



40 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 



but For his own glory. The construction of the passage, therefore, 
which Dr. F. says the Calvinistic cause requires, is not the construc- 
tion which Calvinists adopt. This construction their cause does not 
requiro, but forbids. If such a construction is necessary at all, it 
is to aid Arminians in misrepresenting the Calvinistic sentiments. 
The most natural construction of the passage is, " That God has 
made all things for his own glory ; and the wicked for the day of 
evil," to accomplish the same end. 

"But there is another class of passages, (says Dr. F.) like the follow- 
ing: "He doeth according to "his will in the army of heaven and among 
the inhabitants of the earth." — "He worketh all things after the counsel 
of his own will" — " I will do all my pleasure." But these passages es- 
tablish nothing in opposition to our views, unless it should first be proved 
by other passages, or in some other way, that it is God's will and pleas- 
ure to work all things even wickedness in the wicked." 

But I would ask, why is it necessary to resort to other passages in 
order to prove, that God works all things ; when this is expressly 
asserted in one of the passages which Dr. F. quotes. " Who work- 
eth ALL THINGS after the counsel of liis own will." 

Dr. F. says, 

"That God blinds men and hardens their hearts judicially, -as a just 
punishment for their abuse of their agency, and for this act of his in blind- 
ing and hardening them, He does not make them responsible." 

But to say, that God hardens men judicially, as a punishment for 
sin, is to make the punishment of sin, consist in ^in itself. No 
one pretends, that God holds his creatures responsible for his own acts. 
But when God hardens and blinds men, their hardness and blindness 
are not his act, but the effects of it. And for this hardness and blind- 
ness, He does hold them responsible. He hardened Pharaoh, that 
he should not let Israel go. And for this very hardness and ob- 
stinacy of Pharaoh, God inflicted on him ten plagues, and destroyed 
him in the red sea. Dr. F. proceeds : (p. 10.] 

"And since there are wicked men and lying spirits, they become fit 
instruments in deceiving and tormenting each other; and therefore God 
gives them power and liberty to go abroad decceiving and being de- 
ceived." 

The language here implies, I presume, more than he means. For 
if God gives lying spirits power and liberty to deceive, He doubt- 
Jess chooses, all things considered, that they should deceive. It can 
hardly be supposed, that God gives them more power and liberty 
than He intends they shall exercise. But. although Dr. F.'s Ian- 



ARM1NIANISM EXAMINED. 41 

guage is too strong for Mm, it is not so strong as Scripture, " Now, 
therefore, the Lord hath PUT a- lying spirit in the mouth of all these 
thy prophets," Dr. F. says, 

"As to the passage from Acts, none of us deny, but that Jesus Christ- 
was delivered up to suffer and die by the determinate counsel and fore- 
knowledge of God ; but it is most emphatically denied, that the taking 
and slaying of Jesus Christ by wicked hands, was the result of the de- 
terminate counsel and fore-knowledge of God. If any think otheiwise 
let them prove it." 

It seems then, that God decreed, that Christ should be betrayed ; 
but not, that Judas should betray him. He decreed, that Christ 
should be delivered up to Pilate, but not that the Jews should de- 
liver him up. He decreed, that Christ should be scourged ; but not 
that Pilate should scoufge him. He decreed that Christ should be 
crucified ; but not that his enemies should crucify him. In short, 
God decreed, that Christ should be betrayed, delivered up, mocked, 
bufTetted, spitted on, crowned with thorns, and murdered: but not 
by wicked hands ; that is, it was decreed that He should be mur- 
dered ; but the murder was not decreed. This is in substance the 
theory of Dr. Fisk. " If any think otherwise, let them prove it." 

NUMBER VIII. 

I am now ready to examine Dr. Fisk's objections against the 
doctrine of predestination. 

Objection lv 

"This doctrine of predestination makes God the author of sin." 

Answer. The force of this objection consists in its ambiguity. 
The word author is used in different senses. It sometimes means 
the doer or perpetrator of a thing. In this sense, the author of sin 
is the sinner himself: and the author of the first sin, was the first 
sinner. In this sense God was not the author even of those sins 
which Dr. Fisk will acknowledge, that He decreed : such as Pha- 
raoh's refusing to let Israel go ; Sihon's obstinacy in not the letting 
the children of Israel pass through his borders ; David's numbering 
Israel and Judah ; and the kings of the earth agreeing to give their 
kingdom unto the beast until the words of God should be fulfilled. 
Although God decreed, that these things should be done, He did 
not do them himself 

4* 



42 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 



The word author generally means the approver as well as doer of 
a thing. In this sense, God is not the author of sin, notwithstand- 
ing He has decreed its existence. He neither commits sin himself, 
nor approves it in others. Sin is always that abominable thing 
which his soul hateth. 

But the word author is sometimes used to mean an efficient cause. 
Now I am willing to admit, that those Scriptures which teach that 
God has decreed the sinful conduct of men, do imply, that He is the 
efficient cause of moral evil. For his own glory arid the greatest 
good, He said, Let there he sin, and there was sin. The above ob- 
jection, when stript of all ambiguity, means only, that " God work- 
eth all things (without a single exception) after the counsel of his 
own will.' 5 This I freely admit: but it remains for Dr. Fisk to 
show that it is inconsistent with the Divine character. 
Objection 2. 

"This doctrine of predestination destroys the free-agency and of course 
the accountability of man."- 

Answer. An agent is one that chooses. A free-agent is one 
that acts of choice in the view of motives. Free-agency is the same 
as voluntary action. We can conceive of no higher freedom in the 
universe, than freedom of choice. A free choice is one that is ex- 
empt from involuntary restraint and compulsion. In this sense 
every choice is free, and must be free in its very nature. It is im- 
possible, in the very nature of things, that a choice should be 
brought into existence involuntarily. A choice cannot oppose its 
own existence. If God has decreed that men shall act of choice in 
the view of motives, He has decreed that they shall act freely. And 
when He causes men to act of choice in the view of motives, He 
causes them to act freely. The decrees and agency, of God, there- 
fore, are so far from destroying our free-agency, that they necessari- 
ly secure it. 

Dr. F. says, — ■ 

"That it [predestination] destroys free-will, was seen and acknow- 
ledged by many predestinarians of the old school." 

And he quotes several passages from Mr. Southey's life of Wesley 
to show that this was the case. But the truth is, Calvinists have 
always believed in the free moral agency of man, according to the 
irue import of that phrase, although they have always opposed the 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 43 

Arminian doctrine, that free-agency consists in contingency of 

choice, or a self-determining power. Arminians make free- will the 

same as a self-determining will. It is free-will only as defined by 

Arminians, which Calvinists have opposed. Dr. F. says : 

"A moral agent, to be free, must be possessed of a self-determining 
principle." 

Let us examine this self-determining principle. — What does it 
mean? Does it mean that every choice originates itself? Or, that 
every choice is originated by another choice ? Or, that every choice 
is originated by a principle which is distinct from choice, antecedent 
to it, and the foundation of it? Or, that every choice arises by ne- 
cessity? Or, that every choice arises by chance? Or does it mean 
neither of these things ? 

1. By a self-determining principle, does Dr. F. mean, that every 
choice originates itself? This implies, that every choice is both the 
cause and effect of itself; that it exists before it does exist; that it 
cannot exist till after it has existed ; and that it produces itself, and 
is produced by itself at one and the same instast. Again, 

2. .Does Dr. F. mean, that every choice is produced by another 
choice previous to itself? This implies, that every choice is pro- 
duced by an endless series of choices. A present choice, for in- 
stance, must have been produced by an antecedent choice : and this 
by another previous choice, and so on without end. But perhaps 
Dr. F. means, 

3. That every choice is produced by an internal principle, distinct 
from choice, antecedent to it, and the foundation of it. If our acts 
of choice are produced in this way; then they are produced by an 
involuntary cause ; and the existence of these choices is as una- 
voidable, as if they were produced by an external cause.- This I 
suppose would hardly suit Dr. F.'s idea of freedom, by which he 
seems to mean nothing more nor less than contingency, or absolute 
uncertainty. If our acts of choice are produced by such a cause as 
this, then that cause must operate in order to produce its eifects. 
And that operation must have a cause too ; and that another ; and 
so on, either in an endless series, or back to the first cause of all 
things. I presume, however, that Dr. F. will not admit, that the 
causes of our choices are connected with the first cause of all things. 
For this w r ould lead to the doctrine of ^predestination. And if He 



44 ARMINIANISM EXAMINE!). 

does not admit any such connection ; then, to be consistent with 
himself, he must hold either, that these involuntary causing acts 
come into existence by chance, or else that they are produced by 
an endless series of involuntary causes. Should Dr. F. reject these 
absurdities ; then I ask, 

4. Does Dr F. when he speaks of a self-determining principle, 
mean that our acts of choice arise from the necessity of our natures. 
This supposition would hardly suit Dr. F.'s idea of freedom. For 
he thinks that the responsible acts of creatures must be " unnecessi- 
tated" 

Besides : It is absurd to suppose, that creatures act by the neces- 
sity of their natures, when they do not even exist by any such ne- 
cessity. But, 

5. Does Dr. F. mean, when he speaks of a self-determining prin- 
ciple, that our acts of choice come into existence by change? 
Nothing but chance can meet Dr. F.'s idea of freedom, as consist- 
ing in uncertainty or contingency. For, if our choices are pro- 
duced by a cause, whether external or internal, there can be no. 
contingency in the choices produced. If our choices are effects, 
their cause, whether external or internal, must be entirely distinct 

from its effects, antecedent to them, independent of them ; and com- 
pletely beyond their control. And if our choices arise from the ne- 
cessity of our nature, that necessity must, likewise, be completely 
beyond our control. But if our choices arise neither by causation, 
nor by necessity; then they must arise by chance. If chance, 
therefore, will not meet Dr. F.'s idea of freedom, nothing will. But 
I confess, I have some doubt whether CHANCE itself could make 
Dr. F. as free as he wishes to be. To please him, his volitions must 
be free from every foreign influence. They must be in all respects 
their own masters. They must be free from causation, and free 
from necessity, and free from every spring of action, which is not 
under their own control. But if our choices arise from chance, 
they arise from a source over which they have no control. The 
very idea of chance, is something which is above all control. I 
will, therefore, apply Dr. F.'s ideas of freedom, to this subject, in 
Dr. F.'s own language, with some slight additions, which I will en- 
close in brackets : 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINE!). 45 

" The will — in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly controlled, 
by some secret impulse [of chance] some fixed and all controlling arrange- 
ment [of chance]. It is altogether futile then, to talk about free-agency 
under such a constitution [of chance] : the very spring of motion to the 
whole intellectual machinery, is under the influence of [the] secret in- 
• vincible power [of chance]. And*it must move as that power directs, for 
it is the hand of [Omnipotent chance] that urges it on. He can act as he 
wills, it is true, but the whole responsibility consists in the volition, and 
this is the result of [the] propelling power [of chance]. He wills as he 
is made to will [by chance], he chooses as he must 'choose [by chance]. 
And can a man, upon the known and universally acknowledged princi- 
ples of responsibility, be accountable for such a volition." 

I do not hesitate to affirm, that there is no such thing as 
chance. But if there were any such thing, it would hardly suit 
Dr. F.'s purpose. The freedom Dr. F. seems to be seeking after, 
is something more than freedom from involuntary restraint and 
compulsion. It is freedom in the most absolute sense of that word. 
And his choices, to be absolutely free, must be free not only from 
causation and from necessity, but from chance, and from every thing 
which can account for their existence. As these choices must be 
free from causation, they must not cause themselves ; they must not 
be caused by one another; they must not be caused by a principle, 
nor by any other cause whatever. As they must be free from ne- 
cessity, they must not be self-existent and eternal, but begin to ex- 
ist. As they must be free from every thing over which they have 
no control, they must be free from chance ; and of course not come 
into existence without a cause. Such appears to be the analysis of 
Dr. F.'s self-determining principle. But perhaps when Dr. F. shall 
write another discourse against the doctrine of predestination he 
will give a satisfactory explanation of this self-determining principle. 
If he will do this, he will doubtless receive the sincere thanks of the 
public, as well as the grateful acknowledgements of his friend. 

— @^^— 
NUMBER IX. 

Dr. Fisk says : * 

" It is argued, I know, that man is responsible, because he feels that 
he acts freely, and that he might have done otherwise. To this I reply, 
that this is a good argument, on our principles, to prove that men are 
free — but on the Calvinistic ground, it only proves, that God hath de- 
ceived us. It has made us feel that we might do otherwise, but he knows 



^ ARMINIANISM EXAMIiVEB. 



we cannot— he has determined we shall not So that in fact, this argu- 
ment makes the system more objectionable. While it "does not charge 
the tact in the case, it attributes deception to the Almighty. It is logi- 
cally true, therefore, from this doctrine, that man is not a free-agent, and 
therefore not responsible. A moral agent to be free must be possessed 
ofaself-determmmg principle. Make the will any thing short of this, 
and you put all the volitions, and of course the whole moral man, under^ 
foreign and irresistible influences." ' 

Here Dr. F. takes it for granted, that predestination destroys our 
power to act otherwise than what we do. But this is not true. 
God decreed that Joseph should be sold into Egypt. But his breth- 
ren had power to forbear selling him. God decreed that Pharaoh 
should not give the Children of Israel permission to go ont of his 
land. But Pharaoh had power to give them that permission. He 
decreed that David should number Israel and Judah, but David had 
power to forbear doing that act. 

When God decrees that his creatures shall do a thing, He decrees 
that they shall have a natural power to do it. But a natural power 
to do a thing implies a natural power to neglect doing it. So that 
whenever He decrees that his creatures shall do a thing, He decrees 
that they shall have a natural power to neglect doing it. A man 
may be said to have a natural power to do a thing, when .he has all 
that strength of body and mind which he needs in order to do it. 
But it requires no more strength to forbear doing a thing, than it 
requires to do it. When God decrees that they shall do a thing, 
He decrees that they shall have strength to do it. And He cannot 
decree that they shall have strength to do it, without decreeing that 
they shall have strength enough to neglect doing it: for the former 
necessarily includes the latter. Men cannot fulfil the Divine de- 
crees, without natural strength to fulfil them. And they cannot 
have natural strength to fulfil the Divine decrees without strength 
enough to neglect fulfilling them. ~ A natural power to fulfil the 
Divine decrees, therefore, necessarily implies a natural power to 
frustrate them. 

But perhaps Dr. F. will say, that a natural power in men to frus- 
trate the Divine decrees implies, that they have more power than 
God. I answer, It implies no such thing ; and that, for two reasons. 

1. For this natural power to fulfil or frustrate the Divine decrees, 
men are entirely dependent. And 2. They are entirely dependent 
for the EXERCISE of this natural power. By the exercise of this 



i 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 47 

# 

natural power, I mean their choice. It is this exercise which con- 
stitutes their moral power. So that while God renders men natu- 
rally able to frustrate his decrees, He renders them morally una- 
ble. 

God has, therefore, both the natural and moral power of men in 
his hands, and will do all his pleasure. Although He has given 
them a natural power to frustrate his decrees, He can easily cause 
them to fulfil his decrees. And He does cause them to fulfil his de- 
crees, by controlling their wills. Should Dr, F. still deny this 
distinction between the natural ability and moral inability to frus- 
trate the decrees of God; let him answer the following questions. 
Did not God decree that Pharaoh should refuse to let the children 
of Israel depart out of his land? Notwithstanding this decree, 
was not Pharaoh naturally able to let them go? If not,, why was he 
commanded to let them go, and punished for refusing? Did not 
God decree, that David should say, " Go number Israel and Judah"? 
Notwithstanding this decree, w T as not David naturally able to neglect 
doing this act? If not, why did David acknowledge, that he had 
sinned? and why did God punish him with a pestile?iee? Did not 
God decree that Paul and his company should be preserved in ship- 
wreck, and arrive safe to land? Notwithstanding this decree, were 
not the mariners naturally able to frustrate this design, by fleeing 
out of the ship? If not, why did Paul say, "Except these abide in 
the ship ye cannot be saved."? 

Why is it more absurd, to suppose, that men are naturally able 
to act contrary to what God has decreed ; than it is to suppose that 
they are naturally able to act contrary to what God fore-knows. And 
yet Dr. F. himself believes, that men are naturally able to act con- 
trary to what God fore-knows. Dr. F. believes, that God always 
fore-knew, that men would act precisely as they do : and yet he be- 
lieves and contends, that men are naturally able to act otherwise 
from what they do. But if the Divine fore-knowledge be consistent 
with such a natural ability; then the Divine decrees and agency 
must be equally consistent with it. 

Give men all the natural ability which Dr. Fisk contends for : and 
still it must have been true from eternity, that men would act just 
as they do. And if it was always true, that they would act as they 
do ; then it was always certain. Indeed Dr. F. admits (p. p. 6. 7.) 



48 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

that God fore-knows future events, because they are certain He 
says, "It is not at all difficult to conceive how the certainty of an 
event can beget knowledge," and "whatever God fore-sees will un- 
doubtedly come to pass. 5 ' Now only admit a previous certainty of 
human actions, and you admit the only difficulty which is involved 
in the Divine decrees and agency, on this point. If the Divine de- 
crees and agency are inconsistent with our natural ability and mor- 
al freedom, it is solely on this ground : that they render our actions 
previously certain. But this previous certainty exists, and is admit- 
ted by Dr. Fisk. If natural ability and moral freedom are consis- 
tent with such a previous CERTAINTY; then they must be equal- 
ly consistent with the GROUND or REASON of that certainty* 
Only admit the certainty itself, and how do I increase the difficulty, 
by going a step further^ and saying that this certainty depends on 
something? What new difficulty do the Scriptures throw in the 
way, by representing God as working all things after the counsel 
of his own will ? If there is any difficulty here it consists not in the 
Divine WILL, but in that CERTAINTY, which depends upon it. 
If Dr. F. will show, how free-agency and ability can be reconciled 
with this previous CERTAINTY; he will thereby show, how they 
can be reconciled with the GROUND on which that certainty de- 
pends : and his objection against the Divine decrees, on this point, 
will vanish away. 

Should Dr. F. resort again to his "self-determining principle" 
I will follow him with his permission. If he will prove, that his self- 
determining principle is consistent with the Divine fore-knowledge, 
I will prove in the same way, that it w is consistent with the Divine 
decrees. If he will prove that it is consistent with a previous cer- 
tainty, I will prove in the same way, that it is consistent with the 
universal decrees and agency of God. 

In this and the preceding number I have shown, that free-agency 
consists in choosing, and not in a self-determining principle ; that a 
self-determining principle is a palpable absurdity; and that men 
have a natural though not a moral power to frustrate the decrees of 
God. Dr. F.'s objection, therefore, that predestination is inconsis- 
tent with free-agency, falls entirely to the ground. I am now ready 
to proceed to the next objection. 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 49 

"3. Another strong objection to the doctrine we oppose is, it arrays 
God's secret decrees against his revealed word. God commands men 
not to sin, and ordains, that they shall sin. In his word, he sets before 
them, in striking relief, motives of fear and hope, for the express purpose 
as he informs us, "that they sin not"; but by his predestination and se- 
cret counsel, he irresistibly impels them in an opposite course, for the 
express purpose as this doctrine informs us, to secure their transgression. 
His rule of action is in direct opposition to our rule of duty. And yet he 
is the author of both ! Is God at war with himself, or is he sporting and 
trifling with his creatures? Or is it not more probable than either that 
the premises are false? When or where has God ever taught us, that 
he has two opposing wills? A character so suspicious, to say the least 
of it, ought not without the most unequivocal evidence, to be attributed 
to the adorable Jehovah. In his word we are taught that he is "of one 
mind" — that his "ways are equal"; and who can doubt it?" 

Dr. F. then adds : 

"We are told, it is true, to relieve the difficulty, that this seeming con- 
tradiction is one of the mysteries of God's incomprehensible nature." 

Who has told Dr. F. " that this seeming contradiction is one of 
the mysteries of God's incomprehensible nature"? I presume, the 
Dr. has not heard this from Hopkinsians, nor from well informed 
Calvinists. The most consistent writers on this subject do not ad- 
mit, that the difficulty stated in the above objection, amounts either 
to a contradiction or a mystery. On the contrary, they contend, 
that it admits of a clear and satisfactory solution. Let the two fol- 
lowing distinctions be properly made, and the above objection will 
fall to the ground. 

The first is-the distinction between what God chooses, in itself 
considered, and what he chooses on the whole. And the second is 
the distinction between the commands of God and his decrees. The 
first of these distinctions Dr. F. has virtually made himself. Speak- 
ing of the hypocrisy of moderate Calvinists, he says, (p. 30.): 

"This is a subject, permit me here to say, on which 1 touch with more 
reluctance, than upon any other point, involved in this controversy. To 
represent the thing as it is, seems so much like accusing our brethren of 
insincerity and duplicity, that nothing but a regard to truth, would in- 
duce me to allude to it." 

Here Dr. F. virtually makes the distinction between a thing's be- 
ing undesirable in itself considered, and desirable all things consid- 
ered; and between his not choosing a thing for its own sake, and 
his choosing it on the whole. He exposed the insincerity and du- 
plicity of semi-Calvinists reluctantly for the sake of truth. In itself 
considered, he was unwilling to make the exposure: but all things 



50 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 



considered; considering the demands of truth, he chose to perform 
the painful task. This distinction is made every day in common 
life. It is made in every instance in which a man is said to do a 
thing unwillingly, or reluctantly. And it is also very clearly im- 
plied in Scripture. In itself considered, God does not afflict will- 
ingly, nor grieve the children of men. And yet all things consid- 
ered, He does choose to afflict and grieve them. In itself consid- 
ered, He takes no delight in the death of him that dieth. And yet 
all things considered, He chooses that incorrigible sinners should 
die. In itself considered, He is not willing that any should perish. 
And yet all things considered, (p. 9.) " The Lord hath destined the 
wicked for the day of evil, and this shall be for his glory.''' In itself 
considered, Christ wished the cup to pass from him. But all things 
considered, He drank it to the very dregs. In itself considered, 
the Father would gladly have exempted his beloved Son from suffer- 
ing. But all things considered, f It pleased the Lord to bruise him, 
and put him to grief.' But I will not insult the understanding of 
Dr. F. and of my Methodist brethren, so grossly as to suspect, that 
they cannot see a distinction which is so plain. I shall, therefore, 
for the present, consider it as a settled point, that God may consis- 
tently choose an event in itself considered, which he does not 
choose on the whole: and that He may be unwilling in itself con- 
sidered, that an event should take place, and yet, all things consid- 
ered, choose that it should take place. I am now ready, therefore, 
to consider, 

The second distinction, which is the distinction between the Di- 
vine decrees and the Divine commands. And here, for the sake of 
Dr. F. I will cite a few Scripture examples. God said to Pharaoh, 
u Let my people go, that they may serve me". This was his com- 
mand. Nevertheless, the Lord said unto Moses, " But I will har- 
den his heart, that he shall not let the people go"; this was his de- 
cree. " Honor thy father and thy mother"; this was a Divine com- 
mand. " Thus saith the Lord, Behold I will raise up evil against 
thee out of thine own house '' ; this was a Divine decree, which 
was fulfilled in the conduct of Absalom, the son of David. " Thou 
shalt not commit adultery " ; this was the command of God. " And 
I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy 
neighbor, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun. 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 51 

For thou didst it secretly : but I will do this thing before all Israel, 
and before the sun." This was his decree. " Thou shalt not kill "; 
this was a command. " Now therefore the sword shall never de- 
part from thy house; because thou hast despised me, and hast taken 
the wife of Uriah the Hittite to be thy wife "; this was the decree. 
" Thou shalt not bear false witness "; this was a Divine command. 
" And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the 
mouth of all his prophets. And he said thou shalt persuade him, 
and prevail also : go forth and do so. Now, therefore, Behold the 
Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets, 
and the Lord hath spoken evil concerning thee." This was the Di- 
vine decree. " Thou shalt not covet, 57 was a Divine command. 
" Behold the days come, that all that is in thy house, and that which 
thy fathers have laid up in store unto this day, shall be carried into 
Babylon : nothing shall be left, saith the Lord " ; this was the Di- 
vine decree. " Thou shalt have no other gods before me " ; this 
was an express command. " And the Lord shall scatter thee among 
all people, from one end of the earth even unto the other, and there 
shalt thou serve other gods, which neither thou nor thy fathers 
have known, even wood and stone"; this was a Divine decree. 
" Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image,— thou shalt not 
bow down thyself to them, nor serve them"; this was a Divine 
command. " And the spirit of Egypt shall fail in the midst thereof : 
and I will destroy the counsel thereof: and they shall seek to the 
idols " ; this was a Divine decree. " Thou shalt not take the name 
of the Lord thy God in vain " ; this was a Divine command. " And 
the king shall do according to his will ; and he shall exalt himself, 
and magnify himself above every God, and shall speak marvellous 
things against the God of gods, and shall prosper till the indigna- 
tion be accomplished : for that is determined shall be done " : this 
was a Divine decree. " Remember the Sabbath day to keep it ho* 
ly " ; this was a Divine command. " And he shall speak great 
words against the Most High, and shall wear out the saints of the 
Most High, and think to change times and laws " ; this was a Di- 
vine decree. " Be not deceived," is a Divine command. ' k For this 
cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe 
a lie," this is a Divine decree. It would be easy to multiply ex- 
amples: but those already adduced are sufficient to illustrate the . 



52 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

distinction between the Divine decrees and the Divine commands. 
Dr. Fisk says, 

"But it is not a seeming contradiction, it is a real one ; not an insolva- 
ble mystery, but a palpable absurdity. God prohibits the sinful act — God 
ordains and procures the sinful act — God ivills the salvation of the repro- 
bate, ivhom he has from all eternity irreversibly ordained to eternal death. 
When I can embrace such opposite propositions," &c. 

But wherein does the contradiction consist, between the com- 
mands of God and his decrees? A contradiction consists in affirm- 
ing and denying the same thing. And wherein consists the absur- 
dity of the scripture examples adduced above? An absurdity is an 
inconsistency. To say that God commands a thing, and does not 
command it, is a contradiction. To say that He decrees a thing, 
and does not decree it, is a contradiction. To say that He wills a 
thing, and does not will it, in the same sense is likewise a contradic- 
tion. Now if the commands and decrees of God were the same, they 
would indeed be contradictory and absurd. But they are not the 
same. They differ in several important respects. The commands 
of God respect the nature of things; but his decrees respect them 
as events. The commands of God depend on the distinction be- 
tween what is right and what is wrong in the conduct of his crea- 
tures. But his decrees are not built upon this distinction: but up- 
on the distinction between what is for the best, and what is not for 
the best all things considered. He requires of us what is right for 
ms to do: and He determines to do himself, what is right and best 
for Him to do. He forbids of us, what is wrong for us to do, and 
He determines not to do Himself what would be wrong for him to do. 
His commands express what He chooses in itself considered ; but 
his decrees express what He chooses all things considered. His 
precepts and prohibitions express what He loves and what He hates 
for their own sake ; but his decrees do not. He decrees that many 
things shall exist, which He perfectly hates ; and that many things 
shall not exist, which he ardently loves. His commands are clothed 
with authority ; but his decrees are not clothed with authority. He 
commands as a Legislator; but He decrees only as a Sovereign. 
His commands are the rule of our conduct; but his decrees are the 
rule of his conduct. 

Dr. F. thinks, that if God requires an act which He has not de- 
creed, and decrees that an act shall take place which He has ybrWrf* 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 53 

den; then "his rule of action is in direct opposition to our rule of 
duty." But how so? His rule of action is his will of decree; and 
our rule of duty is his will of command. Is there any opposition be- _ 
tween his will of command and his will of decree ? Dr. F. repre- 
sents them as two opposing wills. But is it so? If God's will of 
decree and his will of command were to be understood in the same 
sense, they would indeed be diametrically opposed to each other in 
all those scripture examples which I have just cited. But his will 
of decree and his will of command, as has been already shown, are 
NOT to be understood in the same sense; and therefore are not op- 
posed to each other. There would be an opposition between his 
choosing a thing, and choosing it not, in the same sense. But there 
is no opposition between his choosing a thing in one sense, and 
choosing it not, in another sense. If He willed a thing^for its own 
sake, and yet willed it not, for its own sake , or if He willed a thing, 
all things considered, and yet willed it not, all things considered, He 
would have two opposing wills. But this He does not do. In all 
those scripture examples which were cited above, God's will of com- 
mand, and his will of decree, are to be understood in differen 
senses; and, therefore, they do not oppose and destroy each other. 
God's will of decree does not destroy his will of command ; nor does 
it destroy our obligation to obey his will of command. Our obliga- 
tion to obey his will of command, is founded on our natural ability; 
and the Divine decree, as was shown in my preceeding number, 
leave our natural ability unimpaired. 

— <&&&— 

NUMBER X. 

I have already answered Dr. F.'s three first objections against the 

doctrine of predestination, and am now ready to answer his next 

objection. 

"4. In close connection with the foregoing objection, it may be added, 
that this system mars, if it does not destroy, the moral attributes of God." 

This objection is founded on the foregoing objections; and in 
answering those, I have virtually answered this. I have shown that 
predestination does not make God a sinner ; that it does not destroy 
the natural ability, free-agency and accountability of man ; and that 

5* 



54 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED^ 

it implies no opposition to God's revealed will, which is the rule of 
our duty. Hence it follows, that predestination neither destroys, 
nor mars the moral attributes of God. Dr. F. says, 

"If He holds men responsible for what is unavoidable," &e. 

The word " unavoidable " is ambiguous. It sometimes denotes 
what we have not natural strength to prevent ; and sometimes merely 
denotes what is infallibly certain. In order to impeach the charac- 
ter of God, it must be made to appear, that He holds us responsible 
for what is unavoidable in the first sense ; that He makes us ac- 
countable for involuntary tb'^gs, which we have not natural strength 
to avoid. But this He doe's not do. He has given us all the natu- 
ral strength we need, in order to be moral agents ; and he holds us 
responsible only for our voluntary, and moral conduct. Dr. Fisk 
continues, 

"If He makes laws, and then impels men to break them, and finally 
punishes them for their transgressions," &c. 

The word "impels" in this connection conveys a wrong idea. 
The Dr.'s phraseology seems to imply, that men are forced to break 
the Divine commands against their wills; and that they have no 
natural power to avoid breaking them. But predestination neither 
counteracts our natural strength ; nor forces us against our wills- 
It only renders it infallibly certain, that we shall freely or voluntari- 
ly act as we do. That it is previously certain, that men will act as 
they do, Dr. F. virtually acknowledges, as we have already seen. 
But this certainty, or necessity of human action is a moral necessi- 
ty, and not a natural It is a necessity of moral exercises ; a ne- 
cessity which is consistent with praise and blame, reward and pun- 
ishment. That previous certainty which Dr. F. contends for, he 
would doubtless say, is consistent with the desert of praise and 
blame, reward and punishment. But the fact, that this previous 
certainty depends on the Divine will, does not, in this respect, alter 
the case at all. Dr. F. goes on to say, 

"If he mourns over the evils of the world, and expostulates with sin- 
ners, saying, " How can I give thee up — my heart is melted within me, 
my repentings are kindled together"— " O Jerusalem! Jerusalem! how 
oft would I have gathered you,' and ye would not"— and still he himself 
"impels the will of men" to all this wickedness— if, I say God does all 
this, where is his veracity? Where is his mercy? Where is his justice ? 
What more could be said of the most merciless tyrant? What of the 
most arrant hypocrite? What does this doctrine make of our Heavenly 



ARMINIAXISM EXAMINED. 5o 

Father? I shudder to follow it out of its legitimate hearings. It seems 
to me, that a belief of it is enough to drive one to infidelity, to madness, 
and to death." 

Is this reasoning, or is it declamation ? If it be reasoning, I 
must undertake to answer it. 

" And still he himself impels the will of men to all this wickedness." 

Answer. Predestination does not imply, that God impels the 
wills of men, according to the literal import of that word; but only 
that " It is God that worketh in you to will and to do," and that 
" He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." His 
working in us to will and to do, does not prevent our willing and 
doing. 

" Where is his veracity ? " 

Answer. In his Holy Word ; not even excepting the two passa- 
ges of Scripture which I have just cited. 

" Where is his mercy?" 

Answer. In his saving penitent sinners from that endless misery 
which they deserve to sutler. 

" Where is his justice ?" 

Answer. In punishing some of his creatures according to their 
deserts, and treating none of his creatures worse than they deserve. 

"What more could be said of the most merciless tyrant?" 

Answer. As much more, as can be said of total selfishness, con- 
trasted with disinterested and infinite benevolence. 

" What of the most arrant hypocrite ? " 

Answer. " Nay, but, O man, who art thou, that repliest against 
God." " Let God be true, but every man a liar; as it is written, 
That thou mightest be justified in thy sayings, and mighest over- 
come when thou art judged." 

"What does this doctrine make of our Heavenly Father?" 

Answer. It exhibits Him as a God of infinite wisdom, of infinite 
benevolence, and of infinite power. It teaches, that in infinite wis- 
dom, He devised the best possible plan of operation; that He adopt- 
ed that plan in infinite benevolence ; and that He is carryiag it in- 
to execution in infinite power. 

"I shudder to follow it out of its legitimate bearings." 

Answer. I regret that Dr. F. should shudder at his own terrors. 
If he would only ' follow out the doctrine into its legitimate bearings,' 
his objections against it, would speedily desert him. The Dr. says, 



56 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

* he REJOICES that the supporters of this system can close their 
eyes against its logical consequences.' On the contrary, we RE- 
GRET that Arminians can close their eyes against the logical con- 
sequences of our system and their own. 

I am now ready to examine Dr. F.\s last objection against the 
doctrine of predestination. 

"5. It puts a plea into the mouth of sinners to justify themselves in 
their sins, and lead to universalism and infidelity. They reason thus. 
Whatever God decrees is according- to his will, and therefore right. And 
God will not punish his creatures for doing right. Whatever God de- 
crees is unavoidable, and God will not punish his creatures for what is 
unavoidable. But "every action and motion of every creature is gov- 
erned by the hidden counsel of God." Therefore, God will not punish 
any of his creatures for any of their acts. Now who can point out any 
fallacy in this reasoning? If, therefore, predestination be true, Univer- 
salism is true, according to the universally acknowledged principles of 
justice." 

Answer. The fallacy of the above reasoning depends upon two 
false principles, which were fully exposed in my last number. One 
of these principles is, that whatever God decrees is according to his 
will of command, and therefore right. And the other principle is, 
that whatever God decrees men shall do, they have no natural pow- 
er to avoid doing. Only make the distinction between God's will 
of decree and his will of command ; and the distinction between 
natural aijd moral ability; and who could help discovering the fal- 
lacy of the reasoning which Dr. F. has put into the mouths of uni- 
versalists. Universalists in general, however, would not be willing 
to acknowledge the Dr.'s reasoning on this subject as a fair speci- 
men of their own. Universalists in general do not deny, that God 
will punish any of his creatures for any of their acts. On the con- 
trary, they generally maintain, that God ivill punish his creatures, 
and punish them fully, either in this life, or the life to come ; though 
they deny, that he will punish them forever. Modern Universalists 
contend for a full punishment in this life, and Restorationists con- 
tend for a limited punishment in the future life. Dr. F. proceeds : 

"And it is a notorious fact, that modern Universalism, which is pre- 
vailing so generally through the country, rests for its chief support on 
the doctrine of predestination." 

But it is not predestination, as explained and maintained by Cal- 
vinists, on which Universalism rests for its chief support. On the 
contrary, the principles of Arminianism lie at the very foundation of 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 57 

the doctrine of Universal salvation. Arminians and Universalists 
agree essentially in their representations of the Divine character; in 
their representations of the ultimate end of creation and providence ; 
in their views of human nature; in discarding the distinction be- 
tween God's will of command and his will of decree ; the distinc- 
tion between what He chooses in itself considered, and what He 
chooses all things considered ; the distinction between natural and 
moral ability ; and the distinction between selfishness and disinter- 
ested benevolence. 

The Arminian says, that there is no such thing as disinterested 
benevolence. The Universalist says the same. The Universalist 
infers^ that there is no essential difference between saints and sin- 
ners ; and of course that all will fare alike in the world to come. 
And if the principle assumed were true, the inference would be 
strictly just. The Arminian says, that the goodness of God must 
lead Him to desire the holiness and happiness of every one of his 
creatures all things considered. The Universalist says the same. 
The Universaiisi infers, that Omnipotence will secure what Infinite 
goodness on the whole desires; and consequently, that all mankind 
will be forever holy and happy. If the principle assumed were true, 
the inference would be strictly just. The Arminian denies the dis- 
tinction which Calvinists make between God's will of command and 
his will of decree; and also the distinction between his choosing a 
thing, in itself considered, and his choosing it all things considered. 
The Universalist does the same; and quotes passages like the fol- 
lowing : " Who will have all men to be saved." The Arminian and 
Universalist both understand such passages, as teaching, that God 
wills the salvation of all mankind, all things considered. The Uni- 
versalist infers, since God's counsel shall stand, and He will do all 
his pleasure, that all mankind will be saved. If the premises were 
true, the inference would be strictly just. There is, therefore, an 
intimate connection between Arminian principles and Universalism. 

No person, I venture to say, was ever led into Universalism by 
reasoning upon Calvinistic principles. Whenever a once professing 
Calvinist has become a Universalist, he has first adopted Arminian 
maxims. And having taken one step towards Universalism, he has 
found the next step comparatively easy. I presume a Universalist 
cannot be found, who has not adopted and who does not retain 



58 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

some of the fundamental principles of Arminianism. " Others hav- 
ing seen, as they thought, that the Scriptures would not support the 
doctrine of Uniyersalism, and that matter of fact seemed to contra- 
dict the above reasoning, in as much as men are made to suffer 
even in this life for their sins, have leaped over all scriptural bounds 
into infidelity. " Dr. F. says, ' he has personally known numbers 
who have been driven by the doctrine of predestination, into open 
infidelity. ' Here is an important concession. The Dr. has virtual- 
ly acknowledged, that men do not become infidels by embracing 
but by rejecting the doctrine of predestination. They are not allured 
by this doctrine, but to use the Dr.'s phraseology they are " driven^ 
by it into open infidelity. This circumstance is strong presumptive 
evidence in favor of the doctrine. For, infidelity arises not from 
love, but from hatred to the truth. " Because they received not the 
love of the truth that they may be saved ; therefore He shall send 
them strong delusion, that they may believe a lie." On the other 
hand, no man was ever driven into infidelity by Arminianism ; but 
thousands have been allured into it ; by adhering to Arminian prin- 
ciples. 

Dr. F. thinks that Fatalism is closely allied to Calvinian predesti- 
nation. Let Fatalism, however, only be. defined, and we shall soon 
see, whether the Dr.'s assertion is correct. Fatalism teaches that 
all things were certain from eternity ; but that this certainty does 
not depend on the Divine will, nor on any cause whatever. Now 
what does Arminianism teach? It admits, that all things were fore- 
known, and of course certain from eternity ; and yet it teaches, that 
this previous certainty, so far at least as it respects human actions, 
does not depend on the Divine will, nor on any cause whatever. 
What does Calvinism teach? It teaches that this previous certain- 
ty does depend on the Divine will. Fatalism denies the distinction 
between natural and moral ability: and so does Arminianism. 
This distinction however, Calvinism admits. It is susceptible of 
strict demonstration, therefore, that Fatalism is directly opposed to 
Calvinism ; and very closely allied in its principles to Arminianism. 
" And it is well known (p. 14.) that the doctrine of fate — is the ele- 
ment in which infidelity " lives and moves, and has its being.'' 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 59 



NUMBER XI. 

I have now shown, that Dr. Fisk has not refuted those argu* 
ments which he professes to refute ; and that he has urged no solid 
objections against the doctrine in question. But before I dismiss 
the doctrine of predestination, I must urge some arguments in favor 
of it, which the Dr. has not yet considered. 

The first argument which I shall here adduce, is founded on the 
dependence of creatures. Constant and entire dependence is in- 
volved in the very idea of a created nature. Independence is an 
underived, essential, and incommunicable attribute of the Divine 
Being. Independent action can belong only to independent exis- 
tence. Independent existence is self-existence. And self-exis- 
tence is necessarily underived and eternal. We must exist in order 
to act; and exist independently in order to act independently. 
To suppose, therefore, that God has commnnicated to us an inde- 
pendent power of acting, is to suppose, that He has communicated 
to us an independent existence. And to suppose that He has com- 
municated to us an independent existence, is to suppose, that He 
has communicated to his creatures an uncreated existence. The 
necessary, constant and entire dependence of creatures upon God, 
therefore, clearly demonstrates, that " Of him and through him and 
to him are all things;" and that ' He literally works all things after 
the counsel of his own will. ' 

My next argument is founded on the relation of cause and effect. 
Every thing which does not exist by necessity, is an effect, and 
must have a cause adequate to its production. Unless this be ad- 
mitted, it cannot be shown*, that there are any effects in existence ; 
and in this case we should have no means left, of proving the exis- 
tence of God. To deny, therefore, that every thing which does not 
exist by necessity, is an effect, leads directly to Atheism. But crea- 
tures do not exist by the necessity of their own nature, and conse- 
quently cannot move and/zc£ by any such necessity. Hence all our 
motions and actions are effects. Every one of them must have a 
cause. But the first cause of all things is God, and since the whole 
chain of causes and effects depends upon his WILL, He must have 
fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass. 



60 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

My third argument is founded on the certainty of future events. 
This argument is indeed similar to the one founded on the Divine 
fore-knowledge ; but it may be presented in a different light. It 
was forever true, that all things would come to pass just as they do; 
and what was forever true, was forever certain. It was certain from 
all eternity, therefore, that all events would come to pass just as 
they actually do. But on what did this certainty depend? Did it 
depend on nothing? To say, it depended on nothing, is the doc- 
trine of Fatalism, which is. a gross absurdity. It must, therefore, 
have depended on something, either in the Divine Being, or out of 
the Divine Being. This certainty from all eternity, could not have 
depended upon any cause out of the Divine Being ; for no other 
cause has existed from eternity. This previous certainty, then, must 
have depended on some cause within the Divine Being. This cause 
was not the Divine perfections alone. The perfections of God can 
secure the existence of no events, independently of the Divine will. 
This previous certainty, therefore, must have depended on the Di- 
vine will, and God must have fore-ordained whatsoever comes to 
pass. 

My fourth argument is founded on' the Divine perfections. God 
is infinite, unchangeable and eternal, in all the perfections of his 
nature. But a denial of the Divine decrees, virtually impeaches 
the Divine perfections. 

It impeaches the Divine wisdom. It is the province of perfect 
wisdom to discern the best end, and devise the best means for its 
accomplishment. The perfect wisdom of God, must from all eterni- 
ty, have discerned and dictated the best possible plan of operation ; 
a plan including every event which w r ould be necessary to the great- 
est good, and precluding every event which would be unnecessary 
to this end. If God has acted according to the dictates of infinite 
wisdom; then He has, from eternity, chosen the existence of all 
those events which were necessary, and the non-existence of all 
those which were unnecessary to the greatest good. But if He has 
done this, then His decrees extend to whatsoever comes to pass. 
To say He has not done this, therefore, is the same as to say, that 
his will is not under the direction of infinite wisdom ; and that He 
is unwise in practice. 

T^o denv the universal decrees of God, is to impeach his goodness. 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 61 

Goodness is voluntary in its own nature. It essentially consists in 
good will, or benevolent intention. This, also, is the very essence 
of the Divine decrees. To limit the decrees of God, therefore, is 
to limit his good will ; and to limit his good will is to limit his good- 
ness. To say that his decrees are not universal, is the same as to 
say, that his goodness is not universal. If his decrees do not ex- 
tend to whatsoever comes to pass, his goodness does not. The 
goodness of God must necessarily choose the existence of all those 
events which are necessary, and the non-existence of all those events 
which are unnecessary to the greatest good. To deny the univer- 
sality of his decrees-, therefore, is to deny the universality of his be- 
nevolent intentions, and impeach his goodness. 

To deny that God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass, is to 
impeach his power. It is the same as to say, that some events ex- 
ist independently of his will, and are above his control. Those 
who maintain, that God has not decreed the moral exercises of His 
creatures, affirm, and find it necessary to affirm, in order to main- 
tain their ground, that God cannot cause the moral exercises of his 
creatures. But to affirm this, is to impeach the Divine power. 
There are three cases in which it may be said, without limiting the 
power of God, that He cannot do certain things. 1. There are 
some things which he cannot do, merely because they are against 
his will. This mode of expression denotes a moral inability on the 
part of God, and not a natural. Thus : when it is said, that God 
cannot lie, nor break his promise, nor do wrong, the meaning is that 
He will not : or, which is the same thing, that He is voluntarily and 
unchangeably true, and faithful and righteous. 2. It may be said 
with reverence, that God cannot cause that which exists by the ne- 
cessity of its own nature. He cannot create space ; for space ex- 
ists by the necessity of its own nature. He cannot make two and 
two equal to four ; for two and two are equal to four, by the neces- 
sity of their own nature. These things do not depend upon the 
Divine will, because they cannot depend upon it. 3. It is proper 
to say, that God cannot do that which involves a contradiction. 
He cannot cause a thing to exist and not to exist at the same time. 
He cannot make the whole less than its parts. He cannot make 
a creature a creator. He cannot communicate self-existence ; nor 
make dependence, independence. God has not power to do these 

6 



62 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINE^, 



things, because they are not the objects of power. The very ex* 
istence of these things implies a contradiction and absurdity. 

But not one of the above mentioned cases applies to the moral ex- 
ercises of men. Those who deny the universal decrees of God, do 
not mean, merely, that He is morally unable to cause the moral ex- 
ercises of men. They do not mean, that He cannot cause them, 
merely because He ivill not. They cannot maintain their ground, 
without denying, that the decrees and agency of God, are consistent 
with the moral agency of men. They cannot consistently mean, 
that if God decrees and causes the moral exercises of men; then 
they have no moral exercises, to be decreed and caused. They can- 
not consistently mean this; for this would be a plain cantradiction 
and absurdity. And if they do not mean this, when they say, that 
predestination destroys our moral agency ; then they must mean y 
if they have any meaning at all, that moral exercises are of such a 
nature tha.t they cannot possibly be produced by Divine power. 
Now if the existence of our moral exercises were in itself necessary ; 
it would be no limitation of the power of God to say, that He can- 
not cause them. But they do not exist by a necessity of nature. 
~This is not even pretended by Arminians. Will it be said then ? 
that God cannot cause moral exercises to exist, because their ex- 
istence involves a contradiction and absurdity ? Surely not. Moral 
exercises in the hearts of men, do exist in reality ; and no reality 
can either be contradictory or absurd. Now if the existence of our 
moral exercises is not in itself necessary, and if their existence in- - 
volves no contradiction nor absurdity ; then it is a limitation of the 
power of God, to say, that He cannot cause them. For Omnipo- 
tence can cause any thing to exist, whose existence is not in itself 
necessary, and whose existence does not involve a contradiction or 
absurdity. The denial of the Divine decrees, therefore, leads di- 
rectly to a limitation of the power of God, and the denial of his Om- 
nipotence. 

My fifth argument is founded on the absurdity of a self-determin- 
ing principle. Those who deny that God has decreed the volun- 
tary exercises of men ; cannot maintain their ground, without hold- 
ing to a self-determining principle in the human will. Such a self- 
determining principle is absurd. Its absurdity I have already par- 
tially exposed. I have shown, that it implies the absurdity, that we 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 63 

choose and exist by the necessity of our natures; or the absurdity 
that every one* of our choices is produced by an endless series of 
choices, which we have before we begin to choose ; or the absurdi- 
ty, that every one of our choices is caused by an endless series of 
"involuntary causing acts; or the absurdity, that our choices all 
come into existence by chance. 

This self determining principle, however, involves other absurdi- 
ties and inconsistencies. A self-determining principle is van indepen- 
dent principle. And for this independent principle we must of course 
be dependent. A self-determining principle in creatures, therefore, 
involves the absurdity of a dependent species of independence. 

A self-determining principle is an ungovernable principle. And 
this ungovernable principle in creatures, must be a created princi- 
ple. A self-determining principle in creatures, therefore, involves 
the absurdity, that God has created what he cannot govern. 

A self-determining principle is an originating principle. And an 
originating principle of choice, is a creating principle ; a principle 
which produces something out of nothing. And this creating prin- 
ciple in creatures is itself created. A self-determining principle 
of choice, in creatures, therefore, involves the absurdity, that God 
has created a creative power. 

A self-determining principle in the human will is inconsistent 
with the doctrine of regeneration. God has said, that ' his people 
shall be willing in the day of his power.' But it is as impossible 
for a self-determining principle to be changed, as for a self-existent 
principle to be annihilated. A self-determining principle could not 
be changed by any external cause ; nor would it ever change itself. 
Its operations would be similar to the operations of that ideal ma- 
chine, called li a perpetual motion'," always producing the same 
kind of results. It is evident, that there can be no change in a self- 
determining principle, UNLESS this principle consists in CHANCE, 
so as to render our acts of choice absolutely contingent and uncer- 
tain. If this be the meaning of a self-determining principle, and 
men possess it, then it is impossible for God to convert a sinner, 
and it depends upon chance whether he will convert himself. It 
would be-impossible for God to sanctify saints ; and it would depend 
entirely upon chance whether they would sanctify themselves. It 
would be impossible for God to confirm the saints in holiness after 



64 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

they arrive in heaven ; and it would depend upon chance whether 
they would continue holy, and remain in that holy and happy place. 
A self-determining principle, therefore, is inconsistent with the doc- 
trine of regeneration, the doctrine of sanctiflcation, and the promises 
of eternal life. 

The leading maxim on which the theory of a self-determining 
principle is built, is inconsistent with the doctrine of human depravi- 
ty. This maxim is, That the quality of an act belongs to its cause, 
or origin. And this maxim subverts the doctrine of human de- 
pravity. If it be said, that our sinful choices are caused by a self- 
determining principle ; this maxim will transfer all our depravity to 
this self-determining principle. But this self-determining principle 
must have a cause too, and that cause must be God. This maxim, 
therefore, will transfer all our depravity to this self-determining prin- 
ciple, and from thence to our Creator. Let our choices be caused 
by what they may, this maxim will transfer the guilt of them from 
one cause to another, till it reaches the first cause of all things. If 
it be said, that our choices are originated by chance ; this maxim 
will transfer all our depravity to chance. If it be said, that our 
choices have no cause, or origin, this maxim would fix the blame 
no where. If our choices are every one the effect of choice, this 
.maxim would transfer all our depravity to a choice before our first 
choice. The fundamental maxim, therefore, on which the theory 
of a self-determining principle is built, entirely subverts the doctrine 
of human depravity. It either drives all depravity out of the uni- 
verse, or fixes it all on God. 

A self-determining principle in the human will is inconsistent 
even with that theory of moral suasion, which Arminians have in- 
vented, in order to extricate themselves from the perplexing diffi- 
culties and absurdities of their system. A self-determining princi- 
ple, is a principle which is independent of all extraneous and for- 
eign influence. A principle which determines itself is one which 
is not, and which cannot be determined by truth, duty or interest. 
It cannot be moved by precepts or prohibitions, promises or threaten- 
ings, rewards or punishments, or any motives whatever. That self- 
determining principle, on which the denial of predestination is 
built, is of all absurdities the most absurd. And if the denial of pre-* 
destination leads to absurdities, the doctrine must be true, 



ARM1NIANISM EXAMINED. 65 



NUMBER XII. 



The doctrine, that God has fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass, 
includes the doctrines, that God has determined the character as 
well as the salvation of the elect. In preceding numbers, I have 
shown, that the objections which Dr. Fisk alleges against the doc- 
trine of predestination are without foundation ; that the doctrine 
stands supported by those very arguments which he undertakes to 
refute ; and that it is fully demonstrated by other arguments, which 
the Dr. passes over in silence. The doctrine, that God has fore-or- 
dained whatsoever comes to pass, therefore, rests on a solid and im- 
moveable foundation; and while this doctrine shall stand, the doc- 
trine of unconditional election will also stand. It would seem, there- 
fore, that I might dismiss the remainder of the Dr.'s sermon, in 
which he attempts to show, that election is conditional ; or that God 
merely decreed the salvation of believers, without decreeing that 
they should become believers. But, although this would be per- 
mitted in a dispute, it would be hardly justifiable in a review. I 
must give no occasion of complaint that I have not treated Dr. F. 
with all that attention which he deserves. " Let us pass then to 
the next proposition.'' 

"11. We come to examine predestination in its particular relation to 
election." 

Dr. F. justly observes that, 

"Several kinds of election are spoken of in the scriptures. There is 
an election of individuals, to perform certain duties appointed by God. — . 
There is an election of whole communities and nations to the enjoyment 
of certain peculiar privileges. — There is a third election — an election 
unto eternal life, and this is the one which has given rise to the great 
controversy in the Church." 

Dr. Fisk proceeds to state the doctrine of election as maintained 
by Calvinists : 

"Those who contend for predestination as objected to by us, maintain 
that — " By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some 
men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others fore- 
ordained to everlasting death. Those of mankind, that are predestinated 
unto life, God, before the foundation of the world, hath chosen in Christ 
unto everlasting glory, ivithout any foresight of faith or good loorks." " 

The last clause of this statement, "without any foresight of faith 
or good works, '' is elliptical. The term previous ox antecedent, must 
be understood. The meaning is, that the elect were chosen in 



06 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

Christ, without any previous or antecedent fore-sight of faith or 
good works ; that is, God did not foresee, that their faith and good 
works would exist, before He decreed that they should exist. God 
did fore-see the faith and good works of the elect, but not antecedent- 
ly either in the order of time, or in the order of nature, to his eter- 
nal purpose which He proposed in Christ Jesus our Lord, concern- 
ing their saving faith and good works. I make this remark, in or- 
der to guard the above statement against the misapprehensison of 
Arminians. 

Dr. F. next gives a statement of conditional election as maintained 
by Arminians. : 

"Others, and this also is our doctrine, hold that "God did decree from 
the beginning, to elect or choose in Christ, all that should believe un- 
to salvation, and this decree proceeds from his own goodness, and is not 
built on any goodness of the creature : and that God did from the begin- 
ning decree to reprobate all who should finally and obstinately continue 
in unbelief." Thus it is seen from the statement of the two doctrines, 
that ours is an election of character, and so far as it relates to individu- 
als, it relates to them only as they are fore-seen to possess that charac- 
ter ; whereas the other relates to individuals, without any reference to 
character." 

On this last extract I will make the following remarks : 
1. The conditional election which Dr. F. and other Arminians 
contend for, implies, that God has not decreed the conversion, and 
sanctification of the elect. Says the Dr.: "Ours is an election of 
character, and so far as it relates to individuals, it relates to them 
only as they are foreseen to possess that character." The character 
here referred to, is the character of persevering believers. " God 
did decree from the beginning to elect, or choose in Christ all that 
should believe unto salvation." The Dr.'s meaning evidently is, that 
God did not decree, that they should believe in Christ, but decreed to 
save them because He fore-saw that they woidd believe in him, and 
persevere in their faith and obedience until death. Let it be dis- 
tinctly understood, then, that the conditional election which Armin- 
ians contend for, implies, that God has not decreed the regenera- 
tion and sanctification of the elect ; but left their regeneration and 
sanctification entirely to themselves. To say that God has decreed 
the regeneration and sanctification of the elect, as well as their sal- 
vation, is to assert most explicitly and fully the Calvinistic doctrine 
of unconditional election. 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 6? 

2. The Arminian thoory as stated above implies, that God has 
not decreed the impenitence and unbelief of those who are lost. 
Hence, 

3. The Arminian notion of a conditional election, implies, that 
the elect have something which they have not received ; and that 
they have made themselves to differ from the reprobates. I should 
like in this connection, to put a few plain questions to Dr. F. 

1. Is regeneration necessary to salvation? 2. Is it the effect of 
Divine influence ? 3. Does God regenerate the elect intentionally 1 
4. When did God form his intentions ; in time, or in eternity ? 

But before I proceed further in the discussion of this subject, it is 
necessary to correct some mistakes, into which the Dr. has fallen in 
his explanation of the Calvinistic doctrine of unconditional election. 
He says, it " relates directly to individuals, without any reference to 
character." It is not so. The election which Calvinists contend 
for, relates directly to individuals, WITH reference to their charac- 
ters, as well as their final condition. It fixes and secures their ho- 
liness, as well as their salvation. Dr. F. says, 

"It is an absolute act of sovereignty." 

This is correct. But let it be remembered, that the sovereignty 
of God is nothing but his wisely directed, and unrestrained good- 
ness. Again, 

" God elects them for no other reason or condition, than because He 
chooses." 

It would have been a more correct representation to have said, 
' God elects them to holiness and happiness for no other reason, 
than because it will be for his own glory and the greatest good.' 

Again, Dr. F. says, 

" He makes no account of man's agency and responsibility, in this de- 
cree of election, but it precedes and is entirely independent of any know- 
ledge of the character of the elect." 

This is not quite correct. The Divine decree SECURES man's 
agency and responsibility. The latter part of the sentence last 
quoted, likewise conveys a wrong idea. Election is to be con- 
sidered in a two-fold view. God has decreed the character of the 
elect, and He has decreed their salvation. In the order of nature, 
He first decreed their character, and thus fore-knew what their char- 
acter would be ; and then He decreed their salvation. His decree 
of their character did, indeed, precede his fore-knowledge of their 



68 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

character ; but his decree to save them presupposes, that He de- 
creed and fore-knew what their character would be. Dr. F. says 
again, 

"The Calvinistic election, to be consistent with itself, requires that, as 
the end is arbitrarily fixed, so the means should be also." 

But neither the end is ''ARBITRARILY" fixed, nor the means. 
Arbitrarily means without reason. But both the salvation of the 
elect, and the means of their salvation were fixed for the highest 
and best of reasons, and in the wisest and best manner. 

I am now ready to examine Dr. F.'s arguments in favor of con- 
ditional election. 

" Our first argument, in favor of conditional election to eternal life, is 
drawn from the position already established, that the decrees of God are 
predicated on his fore-knowledge. And especially, that the decree of 
election to salvation, according to the Scriptures, is founded on the Di- 
vine prescience. " Elect according to the fore-knowledge of God, through 
sanctification of the spirit unto obedience, and sprinkling of the blood of 
Jesus Christ. Whom he did fore-know, he also did predestinate, to be 
conformed to the image of his Son." These scriptures seem to us de- 
cisive, that the decree of election rests on fore-knowledge, and that this 
election is made, not according to the arbitrary act of God, but on the 
ground of sanctification and obedience. The doctrine, therefore, that 
men are predestinated to eternal life, " without any fore-sight of faith or 
good works," must be false." 

This argument is built on a false principle, which has been al- 
ready refuted, viz : That the Divine decrees are founded on the Di- 
vine fore-knowledge. But this principle, though false and absurd, is 
misapplied in the argument under consideration. The principle 
asserts, that God decrees that a thing shall take place because He 
fore-knows it will. Dr. F. was obliged to take this ground, in order 
to get rid of the argument derived from the Divine fore-knowledge, 
in favor of the Divine decrees. No other construction of the prin- 
ciple would then answer his purpose. But now the Dr.'s purpose 
requires a very different construction of the principle which he pro- 
fesses to have established. He does not now represent the decrees 
of God as founded on his fore-knowledge in such a sense, as to de- 
stroy the argument derived from fore-knowledge, in favor of pre- 
destination. In the argument now under consideration, he does not 
mean, that God decrees, that a thing shall take place, because He 
fore-knows it will. Dr. F. does not mean, that God decrees, the 
elect shall be saved, because He fore-knows they will be saved. 
For this would not make the decree of salvation dependent on the 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 69 

condition of conversion and sanctification. It would only make the 
decree that a thing shall take place, dependent on the condition of 
its taking place ; which would be perfect nonsense. The principle, 
therefore, on which Dr. F. professes to found this argument, must 
in this place mean something else. It means, that God has decreed 
one thing, because he fore-knew other things. The Dr. means, that 
God has decreed to save the elect, because He fore-knew that they 
would be converted and sanctified. 

But even the application which Dr. F. makes of this principle, 
will not answer his purpose. It may be admitted, that God decreed 
the SALVATION of the elect, SIMPLY CONSIDERED, because 
He fore-knew their conversion and sanctification. But Dr. F. would 
gain nothing by this admission. Because the question would still 
return, How did God fore-know their conversion and sanctification ? 
The answer is, because HE DECREED them. This very fore- 
knowledge of conversion and sanctification is founded on the Di- 
vine decree. Salvation is suspended on the condition of conver- 
sion and sanctification ; and God has decreed both the end and the 
means. The end depends upon the means ; and God's decreeing 
the end, depends upon his decreeing the means. If the decree which 
fixes the end, depends upon the fore-knowledge of the means ; this 
very fore-knowledge depends upon the Divine decree as its founda- 
tion. So that this is, in effect, only suspending one decree upon an- 
other decree. If this were what Dr. F. meant by a conditional elec- 
tion, I should have no objection to it. But Dr. F. meant not so, 
neither did his heart think so. 

The texts which Dr. F. has quoted, however, will hardly admit 
the construction which he has given to them. " Elect according to 
the fore-knowledge of God, through sanctification of the Spirit, un- 
to obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ." Dr. F. 
understands this passage as teaching, that the saints are elected on 
account of fore-seen " faith and good works." But the language of 
the passage renders this construction absurd. The passage teaches, 
that they are elected " unto obedience." Now how can they be 
elected unto obedience, upon condition of that very obedience? 
" Whom He did fore-know, He also did predestinate, to be coin 
formed to the image of his Son." How could they be predestinated 
to be conformed to the image of Christ, upon condition of that very 



70 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

conformity? In these passages,- the Apostle is not speaking of an 
election to salvation simply considered, but of an election unto holi- 
ness, as the condition of salvation. Dr. F.'s first argument, there- 
fore, in favor of what he calls a conditional election, or, an election 
which does not include conversion and sanctification, is sophistical 
and unsound in every view which can be taken of it. I will now 
proceed to Dr. F.'s second argument : 

"2. The rewardableness of obedience, or the demerit of disobedience, 
can only exist, in connection with the unnecessitated volitions of a free 
moral agent. The scriptures abundantly teach, that to be saved, man 
must believe and obey ; and hence they command and exhort men to be- 
lieve and obey, and promise them the reward of eternal life if they do 
this, and criminate them, if they neglect it. But, according to the doc- 
trine of free-agency already explained, man's obedience or disobedience, 
if it has any just relation to rewards and punishments, must rest, in its 
responsible character, upon the self-determining principle of the will. 
And if this view of the will be correct, there is an utter impossibility of an 
unconditional election. For the very act of God, imparting this self-de- 
termining principle to man, renders it impossible, in the nature of things, 
for the Almighty himself to elect a moral agent, unconditionally. The 
argument stands thus. — The scriptures make man a responsible moral 
agent ; but this he cannot be, if his will be controlled by foreign and un- 
avoidable influences — therefore it is not so controlled: that is„ man has 
within himself, a self-determining principle, in the exercise of which, he 
becomes responsible. This being established, we argue again — The 
doctrine of unconditional election necessarily implies irresistible grace, 
absolutely impelling and controlling the will. But this would be to coun- 
teract God's own work, and to destroy man's accountability; therefore 
there is no such irresistible grace, and of course, no such unconditional 
election. And since there is an election to eternal life, spoken of in the 
scriptures, it follows conclusively, if the foregoing reasoning be sound, 
that this election is conditional. Hence we may bring forward, in one 
overwhelming argument, all the numerous and various bible conditions 
of salvation, as so many scripture proofs of a conditional election." 

This argument is founded on a false assumption, which I have 

already shown to be unscriptural, absurd and ridiculous. It is this, 

that a self-deter mining principle is necessary to moral agency. 

"The rewardableness of obedience, or the demerit of disobedience, 
can only exist, in connection with the unnecessitated volitions of a free 
moral agent." 

" Unnecessitated volitions." If our volitions are " unnecessitated"; 
then they arise by chance, to all intents and purposes. To be un- 
necessitated, they must not arise from the necessity of our nature. 
They must not arise from any cause whatever, whether external or 
internal, voluntary or involuntary. According to the principle as- 
sumed in this argument, our volitions cannot be of a moral nature, 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 71 

unless they arise altogether by CHANCE. And this theory is in- 
consistent with all the promises, predictions and doctrines of the 
Bible. 



NUMBER XIII. 

I will proceed in the examination of Dr. Fisk's arguments in favor 
of conditional election. 

"3. The cautions to the elect, and the intimations of their danger 
and the possibility of their being lost, are so many scripture proofs of a 
conditional election. Why should the saints be exhorted " to take heed 
lest they fall?" "lest there be in them an evil heart of unbelief, in depart- 
ing from the living God ?"," lest a promise being left of entering into rest, 
any should come short?" lest they should "also be cut off?" Why should 
St. Paul fear lest, after having preached to others, he should be cast 
away? Either there is, or is not, danger of the elect's being lost. — If 
not, then all these passages are not only without meaning, but savor very 
strongly of deception. They are false colors held out to the elect, for the 
purposes of alarm and fear, where no fear is. — Will it be said, that pos- 
sibly some of those addressed, were not of the elect, and were therefore 
deceiving themselves, and needed to be cautioned and warned? I answer, 
they had then nothing to fall from, and no promise of which to come ' 
short. Besides, to warn such to standfast, seems to imply, that the Holy 
Spirit ©autionedthe reprobates against the danger of becoming the elect, 
which idea, while it intimates a very ungracious work, for the "Spirit of 
grace "to be engaged in, clearly indicates, that there was danger of 
breaking the decree of reprobation! We ask again therefore, what do 
these scriptures mean? Will it be said, as some have argued, that these 
warnings and cautions are all consistant, because they are the very means 
by which the decree of election is made sure? But let it be understood, 
that the end is fixed, before the means; because Calvinism tells us, that 
this election is "independent of any faith or good works foreseen," and 
that "God's decree lays a necessity on all things, so that every thing he 
wills, necessarily comes to pass," and is therefore sure, "because he has 
decreed it." The moment therefore, God decrees an event, it becomes 
sure, and to talk of danger of a failure in that event, implies either a 
falsehood, or that God's decree can be broken. Butcalvinists, I presume, 
will not allow that there is any danger of counteracting or frustrating the 
plan of the Almighty. Hence there is no danger of the elect's coming 
short of salvation. All the exhortations, cautions and warnings there- 
fore, recorded in the scriptures, are false colors and deceptive motives. 
They are like the attempts of some weak parents, who undertake to 
frighten their children into obedience, by superstitious tales and ground- 
less fears. God knows, when he is giving out these intimations of dan- 
ger, that there is no such danger ; his own eternal, unchangeable decree 
had secured their salvation, before the means were planed — all this if 
election is unconditional. But far be this from a God of truth. If he 
exhorts his creatures to "make their election sure," he has not made it 



72 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

sure. If he teaches them to fear, lest they fail of the grace of God, there 
is doubtless real danger. The conclusion therefore is irresistible that 
God hath suspended his decree of election to eternal life, on conditions. 
"He that believeth shall be saved." 

The plausibility of this argument, depends entirely upon the as- 
sumption, that previous infallible certainty precludes the idea of dan- 
ger. But this assumption is untenable. It is as inconsistent with 
Dr. F's scheme as with the Calvinistic. Dr. F. maintains, that 
God fore-knew all things from eternity. Let Dr. F. then answer 
this simple question ; and reconcile his own answer, with his own 
belief. Is there any danger that events will not take place, which 
God always fore-knew certainly would take place? If previous 
certainty precludes the idea of danger; then the Divine fore-know- 
ledge precludes the idea of danger. And if so, then there is no 
such thing as danger in the universe. 

The truth is, there is a distinction between absolute danger, and 
relative danger ; and between danger with respect to God, and dan- 
ger with respect to his creatures. If an event will certainly take 
place, there is no danger absolutely speaking, that it will not take 
place ; though there may be danger relatively speaking. There is 
no danger with respect to God, but there may be danger w T ith re- 
spect to his creatures. Danger is the same as liability to evil. This 
liability to evil, is applicable solely to creatures ; and is founded in 
their imperfection. 

I will illustrate this idea by a few examples. It was decreed, 
fore-known and predicted, that Paul and his company should survive 
the shipwreck, and get safe to land. But yet they were naturally 
able to flee out of the ship ; and considered as they were in them- 
selves, they were liable to do so. They were at first inclined to flee 
out of the ship, at the risk of their lives ; and had their preservation 
depended on their own wisdom, they would certainly have perished. 
But they were directed by the unerring wisdom and almighty pow- 
er of God. In respect to God, therefore, there was no danger in 
their case. But considered as they were in themselves, fallible and 
imperfect creatures, they were in imminent danger. It was decreed 
that Moses should be the law-giver and deliverer of the Hebrew na- 
tion. With respect to God, therefore, there was no danger of his 
perishing in the ark of bulrushes. But yet considering him as he 
was in himself, while in that situ^*^ * weak and helpless infant. 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 73 

he was in imminent danger of a premature death. God had elected 
David to the throne of Israel. With respect to God, therefore, 
there was no danger of his perishing by the hand of Saul. But con- 
sidering him as he was in himself, he was in imminent danger of 
falling a prey to his vigilent and powerful enemy. 

It is just so, with regard to the elect. In respect to God there is 
no danger of their being lost. But, considered as they are in them- 
selves, fallible and imperfect creatures, they are in imminent danger 
of losing their own souls. They cannot safely trust to their own 
hearts, nor lean to their own understandings. If their salvation de- 
pended on an arm of flesh, they would perish without remedy. 
They are surrounded with temptations, and exposed to internal and 
external enemies; and they must watch and pray, and comply with 
the warnings and admonitions of the gospel, in order to enter into 
the kingdom of heaven. And although they will be eventually 
saved, they will, with respect to themselves, be saved with danger 
and difficulty ; being kept only by the mighty power of God, through 
faith unto salvation. Dr. F. represents unconditional election as 
fixing the end before the means. This representation conveys a 
wrong idea. It implies that the means are unnecessary ; and that 
the end can take place without them. The end is not fixed be- 
fore the means, in this case, any more than in any other. When- 
ever a plan is formed, the end is proposed before the means are 
proposed; but the end is never FIXED, till after the means are 
FIXED. God did not decree the salvation of the elect indepen- 
dently of their character, as true and persevering believers. On 
the contrary, the decree of election connects the means and the 
end inseparably together. Unconditional election, therefore, is so 
far from making the cautions and warnings of the gospel unneces- 
sary, that it makes a compliance with them absolutely necessary to 
salvation. The exhortations, cautions* and warnings, therefore re- 
corded in the Scriptures are not false colors nor deceptive motives. 
They imply no more danger in the case of the elect, than there 
actually is, considering them as they are in themselves. 
Dr. F. says, 

"If He exhorts his creatures to " make their election sure," he has not 
made it sure." 



74 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 



Now it is readily admitted that God has not made their election 
sire in THAT SENSE in which He exhorts THEM to make it 
sire. Nor does He < exhort them to make their election sure, in 
the same sense, in which He has made it sure. He has made it 
sure to Himself; and He exhorts them to make it sure, to them- 
selves. He has made it sure by his eternal decree; and He exhorts 
them to make it sure by a present compliance with the terms of sal- 
vation. It has already been shown that men have a natural power 
to act contrary to what God decrees, as well as contrary to what He 
fore-knows. This is the case with the elect. They have a natu- 
ral, though not a moral power to commit sin unto death. Every 
saint is naturally able to blaspheme against the Holy Ghost. This 
natural power implies a natural possibility; and a natural possibility 
creates danger. It does not indeed create any danger with respect 
to God, but it does with respect to his creatures. The whole ar- 
gument under consideration, therefore, is founded on a false as- 
sumption, and therefore it proves nothing to Dr. F.'s purpose. His 
argument no more proves that God did not DECREE the conver- 
sion and sanctification of the elect, than it proves that He did not 
FORE-KNOW their conversion and sanctification. 

1 will now examine Dr. F.'s fourth argument in favor of condi- 
tional election. 

" 4 This accords also with christian experience. What is it that pro- 
duces much fear and trembling, in the mind of the awakened sinner? 
Why does he feel, that there is but a step between him and destruction ? 
Is it fancy, or is it fact? If it is imagination merely, then all his alarm 
is founded in deception, and he has either deceived himself, or the spirit 
of God hath deceived him. In either case, this alarm seems necessary, 
in order to lead him to Christ. That is, it is necessary for the conver- 
sion of one of the elect that he be made to believe a lie. But if it be 
said, that it is no lie for he is really in danger; then we reply again, the 
decree of God hath not made his election sure, and of course, therefore, 
it is condition." 

This argument depends upon the foregoing: and in answering 
th,at, I have virtually answered this. Both this and the preceding 
argument depend upon the principle, that 'previous certainty pre- 
cludes the idea of danger. If this argument, therefore, proved any 
thing to Dr. F.'s purpose, it would prove too much. It could not 
subvert the doctrine of unconditional election, without subverting 
the doctrine of the Divine fore-knowledge. And as it proves too 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. ^O 

much, it proves nothing at all. I will therefore proceed to Dr. F.'s 

fifth and last argument. 

"5. Express passages of scripture teach a conditional election. — We 
have time only to notice a few of them. Mat. xxii. 14. " For many are 
called, but few are chosen." This passage, with the parable of the 
wedding that precedes it, teaches that the choice was made, subsequent- 
ly to the call, and was grounded on the fact, that those chosen, had actu- 
ally and fully complied with the invitation, and had come to the wedding 
duly prepared. John xv. 19, "If ye were of the world, the world would 
love you, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world 
hatheth yon." This passage teaches that Christ's disciples were once 
of the world, and that he had chosen them out of the world, and this 
choice evidently refers to that time, when they became of a different char-, 
acter from the world; for then it was, and in consequence of that elec- 
tion, that the world hated them. II. Thes. ii. 13. "Because God hath, 
from the beginning, chosen you to salvation, through sanctification of the 
spirit and belief of the truth." Here is a condition plainly expressed. 
This is not an election unto sanctification, but an election through or hy 
sanctification and faith unto salvation." 

" For many are called, but few are chosen." Dr. F. thinks " that 
the choice was made subsequently to the call, and was. grounded on 
the fact, that those chosen had actually and fully complied with the 
invitation, and had come to the wedding duly prepared." It is true 
the choice was mentioned after the call : but this by no meaus proves^ 
that the choice was made after the call. The passage asserts no 
such thing. To make the passage teach this sentiment, Dr. F, 
must make it appear that the word "subsequently'" is understood, 
" Many are called, but few are [subsequently] chosen." Till Dr. 
F. shall have adduced a better proof than his own assertion, that 
this word is to be understood; I have as good a right to say, that 
the word previously is to be understood instead of the word subse- 
quently. Thus : " Many are called, but few are [previously] chosen/' 
Dr. F. next quotes John 15, 19. "If ye were of the world, the 
world would love his own; but because ye are not of the world, 
but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth 
you." Dr. F. says, " this cJwice evidently refers to that time when 
they become of a different character from the world ; for then it was, 
and in consequence of that election, that the world hated them." But 
I would ask Dr. F. whether the world would be likely to hate chris- 
tians more because they were elected in time, than because they 
were elected from eternity? The construction which Dr. F. puts 
upon this passage is altogether arbitrary and groundless. It is ho- 



76 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

liness which distinguishes christians from the world. And to be 
chosen out of the world is to be chosen unto hcliness. The princi- 
pal reason why the world hate christians, is because God has made 
christians to differ from the world in the spirit and temper of their 
minds, according to his eternal purpose which He purposed in 
Christ Jesus our Lord. Dr. F. next quotes, IT. Thes. ii. 13. " Be- 
, cause God hath from the beginning, chosen you. to salvation through 
sanctification of the spirit and belief of the truth." Dr. F. says, " Here 
is a condition plainly expressed. — This is not an election unto sanc- 
tification, but an election through or by sanctification and faith un- 
to salvation," This passage does not justify the inference which 
Dr. F. draws from it. It asserts that the elect " are chosen unto 
salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the .truth." 
The Dr. infers that they cannot be chosen unto sanctification and 
faith. But is this a just inference? Because God has determined 
to accomplish the end, by or through means; does it hence follow 
that He has not determined the means? Is it therefore, certain, that 
He has left the means, and the chosen end depending upon them, 
to mere chance ? If the Scriptures teach either expressly or im- 
plicitly, that saints were not elected to conversion and sanctification, 
as well as salvation, Dr. F. has not been able as yet to point out 
those passages. 

u From the whole then it appears, that the holy Scriptures, the 
Divine attributes and government, and the agency of man do [not] 
stand opposed to an unconditional, and are [not] in favor of a con- 
ditional election." 

NUMBER XIV. 

I have examined Dr. Fisk's arguments in favor of "conditional 
election ;" and I am now ready to inquire whether Dr. F. has re- 
futed the arguments, adduced by Calvinists, in favor of uncondi- 
tional election. These arguments Dr. F. represents as consisting 
merely in certain texts of Scripture, which he arranges into three 
distinct classes : ' 1. Those passages which speak of a predesti- 
nation unto holiness ; 2. Those which speak of election as depen- 
ding solely on the sovereign will of God ; 3. Those which declare 
salvation to be of works and not of grace, - 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 77 

The first class of texts, which Dr. F. undertakes so examine, "is 
those which speak of a predestination unto holiness." He men- 
tions his own text as one of the strongest instances of this kind. — 
" According as He hath chosen us in Him before the foundation 
of the world, that we should be holy, and without blame before 
Him in love. Having predestinated us unto the adoption of chil- 
dren by Jesus Christ unto himself; according to the good pleas- 
ure of his will." Also, Rom. viii, 29; "For whom. he did fore- 
know, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his 
Son," " whom did He predestinate — He called — justified — and 
sanctified." To the argument founded on these and similar texts, 
in favor of unconditional election, Dr. F. makes the following re- 
ply : p. 19 : 

"But if these passages had an allusion to a personal election to eter- 
nal life, they would not prove unconditional election, " because*" to use 
the language of another, "it would admit of being questioned, whether 
the choosing in Christ, before the foundation of the world here men- 
tioned, was a choice of certain persons as men merely, or as believing 
men, which is certainly the most rational." This exposition must neces- 
sarily be given to the passage from the Romans, since those who were 
the subjects of predestination, were first fore-known. Fore-known, 
not merely as existing, for in this sense, all were fore-known, but fore- 
known, as possessing something which operated as a reason why they 
should be elected, rather than others. Fore-known doubtless as believ- 
ers in Christ, and as such according to the plan and decree of God, they 
were to be made conformable to the image of Christ's holiness here, and 
glory hereafter." 

Here Dr. F. represents the Scripture as teaching, that God has 
not decreed the conversion of the elect; but their sanctijication. — ■ 
He thinks, that those passages which speak of a personal election 
unto holiness, do not mean that the elect are predestinated unto ho- 
liness, as men, but only as believers. That is to say, 'God has not 
decreed, that the elect should become holy in their conversion ; but 
only that they should continue holy, after their conversion. On Dr. 
F's. construction of these passages, I. would make the following re- 
marks : 

1. Dr. F. admits, that the Scriptures speak of a personal elec- 
tion unto holiness. He so understands and explains the passage re« 
ferred to in Rom. viii, 29. 

2. Dr. F. contends that this personal election unto holiness 

means, that God has predestinated believers unto holiness, 

7* 






78 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

Hence, 3. Dr. F. must, to be consistent, admit the doctrine of 
the saints perseverance. If God has decreed the holiness of be- 
believers; then they will certainly persevere in holiness, and be 
finally saved. I presume, however, that Dr. F. is no better pre- 
pared to admit the doctrine of the saints perseverance, than the 
doctrine of unconditional election. If God has predestinated be- 
lievers unto holiness, then they have no self-determining principle 
of choice. And if there is no self-determining principle in the 
human will; then they are necessarily dependent on the will of 
God, for all their exercises : and the truth of unconditional elec- 
tion follows irresistibly, Here then is a dilemma. Those passa- 
ges " which speak of a personal election unto holiness/' according 
to the Calvinistic construction, teach the doctrine of unconditional 
election directly ; but according to the Arminian construction these 
passages refer to believers, and teach the doctrine of saints perse- 
verance directly and the doctrine of unconditional election indi- 
rectly and by necessary inference. For the present Dr. F. may 
take which horn of the dilemma he chooses. 

Dr. F. thinks " This exposition must necessarily be given to the 
passage from Romans, since those who were the subjects of pre- 
destination, were first fore-known. Fore-known not merely as ex- 
isting, for in this sense all were fore-known, but fore-known, as pos- 
sessing something which operated as a reason why they should be 
elected rather than others. Fore-know T n doubtless as believers in 
Christ, and as such, according to the plan and decree of God, they 
were to be made conformable to the image of Christ's holiness 
here, and glory hereafter." But why may they not be fore-known 
as those whom it was for the best, all things considered, to predes- 
tinate to be conformed to the image of Christ? Is it reasonable to 
suppose, that the elect were predestinated to be conformed to the 
image of Christ upon condition of their conformity? But whether 
this construction be reasonable or unreasonable, it will not help Dr. 
F. out of his dilemma. 

When Dr. F. comes to explain his own text, he says, he does not 
understand it as referring to a personal election, but to "that gen- 
eral plan of God which had been fixed from the beginning, of ad- 
mitting the gentiles as well as the Jews to the privileges of the cov- 
enant of grace 3 on equal terms and conditions." Let us then, to 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 79 

please Dr. F. read his text according to his own construction : 
" According as He hath chosen us [gentiles as well as Jews ; be- 
lievers and unbelievers] in Him, before the foundation of the world, 
that we should be holy and without blame before Him in love. 
Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus 
Christ, to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will." Is 
not this precisely the construction which Universalists would put 
upon this passage ? 

Dr. F.'s exposition of this passage, however, does not at all affect 
the argument founded on that class of passages, which, it is admit- 
ted on all sides, speak of a personal election unto holiness. For if 
these passages refer to the elect before their conversion they teach 
the doctrine of unconditional election directly ; and if they refer to 
the elect, as Arminians contend, after their conversion, then, as it 
has been shown, they teach the doctrine of unconditional election 
indirectly ; by establishing the saints perseverance. 

But it is possible that Dr. F. will think it expedient hereafter, to 
explain cdl those passages which speak of a predestination unto ho- 
liness, as referring to nations and communities. Perhaps he will 
say, that these passages teach only, that certain nations and com- 
munities are unconditionally elected unto the peculiar privileges of 
the gospel. But, although it would be w r resting the scriptures from 
their most plain and obvious meaning, to give such a construction 
to ali those passages, yet it would be of no real advantage to the 
Arminian cause. For an unconditional election of nations and 
communities to the privileges of the gospel, implies an unconditional 
election of individuals to the same privileges. An unconditional 
election of nations and communities to the means of salvation, in- 
cludes also an unconditional election of some individuals to eternal 
life. It is absurd to suppose, that God would have appointed the 
means of salvation, if it were not his intention to render them ef- 
fectual to the conversion and salvation of some sinners. Indeed, 
the unconditional election of a part of mankind to the means of 
salvation, evidently implies the unconditional reprobation of the 
rest, to whom these means are not sent. Every objection which can 
be brought against unconditional election, lies equally against that 
plan of divine government, which sends the gospel to some and 
withholds it from others. For ought Dr. F. has said, therefore, that 



80 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

class of passages which speak of predestination unto holiness, must 
remain in their full force, in favor of the doctrine of unconditional 
election. 

The second class of passages which Dr. F. undertakes to exam- 
ine, is those which speak of election as depending on the sovereign 
will of God alone. Dr. F. thinks the ninth chapter of Romans is 
the strongest portion of Scripture, on this subject; and he under- 
takes to show, that this refers only to a national election to the priv- 
ileges of the gospel. But — suppose it does; it is still in point. 
For this chapter proves beyond a doubt, that the means of salvation 
depend on the sovereign will of God ; and that it depends entirely 
upon his sovereign will, to whom these means shall be sent, and to 
whom they, shall not be sent. It depends, likewise, on the sovereign 
will of God, whether the gospel itself, shall prove a savor of life 
unto life, or of death unto death. For our Savior says, "No man 
can come unto me except the Father who hath sent me, draw him." 
God says, " A new heart will I give you, and a new spirit will I 
put within you.'' — " Of his own will begat he us, by the word of 
truth." — " Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the 
flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." — " So then, neither is he 
that planteth any thing, neither he that watereth, but God that giv- 
eth the increase." We have therefore, the most decisive evidence 
from Scripture, that both the means of salvation, and their efficacy 
depend on the sovereign will of God. Dr. F.'s attempt to explain 
away the ninth chapter of Romans will avail nothing to his pur- 
pose, unless he can show, that the Scriptures no where represent 
the conversion and sanctification of the elect, as depending on the 
Divine will. And this, I presume the Dr. will not undertake to do. 
But if he will admit that regeneration and sanctification are the 
work of God ; and, that whatever God does, he does intentionally , 
then, to be consistent, he must admit, that God has decreed their 
conversion and sanctification, as well as their salvation. 

I do not mean, however to be understood to admit, that the ninth 
of Romans contains nothing in reference to personal election ; es- 
pecially in the following passages: i '" So then it is not of him that 
willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. 
Therefore, hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom 
he will he har^eneth." But the argument founded on the second 



ARMINIANISxM EXAMINED. 81 

class of texts which Dr. F. undertakes to examine does not depend 
at all on his exposition of the ninth of Romans, so long as it is 
admitted on all sides, that regeneration and sanctification are the 
work of God, and depend entirely upon his will. 

The third class of passages, which Dr. Fisk undertakes to ex- 
amine, is " Those which declare salvation to be of grace and not of 
works." Dr. F. quotes several passages of this description, and 
fully admits, that salvation is of grace, from beginning to end. He 
very justly observes that, " There was nothing in all the character 
and cirmmstancns of the fallen family , except their sin and deserved 
misery, that could claim the interposition of God*s saving power" 
But Dr. F. asks, " Cannot a conditional election be of grace ?" 
Answer. — It cannot be in all respects of grace, unless grace cause 
the condition to be fulfilled. Again he asks, " Now if salvation is 
conditional, and yet of grace, why not election V 7 Answer. — Sal- 
vation, though conditional is entirely of grace, because grace causes 
the condition itself to be fulfilled. And if Arminians meant no 
more than this by conditional election, Calvinists would not dispute 
them on this point. If by conditional election, Arminians meant 
merely, that salvation is suspended on conversion and sanctification 
in that eternal purpose which secures both the end and the means, 
I freely admit, that it is all of grace. But they are not understood 
to mean this. The conditional election, they contend for, suspends 
the end upon the means, but leaves the means to contingency or 
chance. It suspsnds salvation upon conversion and sanctification, 
but leaves conversion and sanctification to sinners themselves. It 
is easy to see, that such an election as this is not of grace so far as 
it respects conversion and sanctification. All those passages, there- 
fore, which speak of conversion and sanctification as produced by 
the grace of God, clearly imply, that they are dependent entirely 
upon his will, and are fore-ordained. But we will let Dr. F. speak 
for himself: 

" But that our doctrine of election is of grace, will appear evident I 
think, from the following considerations : 1. It was pure unmerited love, 
that moved God to provide salvation for our world. 2. The gospel plan, 
therefore, with all its provisions and conditions, is of grace. Not a step in 
that -whole system, but rests in grace, is presented by grace and is exe- 
cuted through grace. 3. Even the power of the will to choose life and 
the conditions of life, is a gracious poiver. A fallen man, without grace, 
could no more choose to submit to God, than a fallen angel. Herein we 



82 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

differ widely from the Calvinists. They tell us man has a natural pow- 
er to choose life. If so, he has power to get to Heaven, without grace I 
We say, on the contrary, that man is utterly unable to choose the way 
to Heaven, or to pursue it when chosen, without the grace of God. It 
is grace that enlightens and convinces the sinner, and strengthens him 
to seek after and obtain salvation, for "without Christ we can do noth- 
ing." Let the candid judge between'us then, and decide which system 
most robs our precious Redeemer of his glory, that which gives him a 
native and inherent power to get to Heaven of himself, or that which at- 
tributes all to grace. 4. Finally, when the sinner repents and believes, 
there is no merit in these acts to procure forgiveness and regeneration, 
and therefore, though he is now and on these conditions elected, and 
made an heir of salvation, yet it is for Christ's sake, and, " not for works 
of righteousness which he has done." Thus, we "bring forth the top 
stone with shouting, crying grace, grace, unto it." 

It does not. appear from the above paragraph, that regeneration 
and sanctifi cation, on Dr. F.'s ground, depend, at all, on the graee 
of God. For if they depend upon his grace, they must depend 
upon his sovereign will. And to say that they depend upon his 
sovereign will, implies that they are fore-ordained. 

Dr. F. represents the saint us ' elected on account of fore-seen 
faith and good works.' And yet he expressly says, in the above 
paragraph, that it is " not for works of righteousness which he has 
done." Will the Dr. have the goodness to explain his meaning? 

Dr. F. says, ^j^ " Even the power of the will to choose life, and 
the conditions of life, is a gracious power." ^^/jQ Now this " gra- 
cious power" according to Dr. F.'s own explanation is nothing 
more nor less than " a self-determining principle in the will." 
This self-determining principle in the will, Dr. F. represents as es- 
sential to a moral agent. Hence it follows, that grace is the sole 
ground of moral agency. 

Without this self-determining principle, according to Dr. F. men 
are incapable of sinning. And if this is a "gracions power/' then 
grace is necessary to enable them to sin. If they\become holy by 
grace, merely because they exercise a u gracious power," then they 
sin by grace for the same reason. 

If this self-determining principle is necessary to our moral agency, 
it was necessary to the moral agency of Adam, before he sinned. 
And if this is a gracious power, then Adam was a subject of grace, 
before he fell. 

The holy angels are moral agents as much as men. And if they 
possess a self-determining principle, and this is a " gracious power" ; 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 83 

then the angels in heaven are indebted to the grace of God for their 
moral character. 

The devil is a moral agent ; for " The devil sinneth from the be- 
ginning." If a self-determining principle, therefore, be necessary 
to a moral agency and this be " a gracious power"; then Satan 
himself is a subject of grace. Such are a few of the beauties of 
Arminianism. But Dr. F. says, 

"Herein we differ widely from the Calvinists." 

And so be it. 

" They tell us man has a natural power to choose life. If so, he has 
power to get to heaven without grace. 

But how so 1 This natural power neither renders men guiltless 
nor independent. Their salvation depends entirely upon the renew- 
ing and pardoning, grace of God. Their natural power, there- 
fore, neither enables them to get to heaven independently of God, 
nor without his grace. 



NUMBER XV. 

I am now ready to examine Dr. Fisk's objections against uncon- 
ditional election. 

Obj. "1. The doctrine of the unconditional election of a part, neces- 
sarily implies the unconditional reprobation of the rest.' 

Answer. If unconditional reprobation means, that God has de- 
creed the character as well as the destination of the finally impeni- 
tent; it is freely admitted, that this doctrine is implied in the doc- 
trine of unconditional election. If ' God has mercy on whom he 
will have mercy; it undoubtedly follows, that whom He will, He 
hardeneth. 5 

Obj. "2. This doctrine of election, while it professes to vindicate free 
grace and the mercy of God, destroys them altogether. To the repro- 
bates, there is certainly no grace or mercy extended. Their very ex- 
istence, connected as it necessarily is, with eternal damnation, is an in- 
finite curse. The temporal blessings which they enjoy, the insincere 
offers that are held out to them, and the gospel privileges with which 
they are mocked, if they can be termed grace at all, must be called 
damning grace. For all this is only fattening them for the slaughter, and 
fitting them to suffer, to a more aggravated extent, the unavoidable pains 
and torments that await them. Hence Calvin's sentiment, that " God 
calls to the reprobates, that they may be more deaf — kindles a light that 
they may be more blind — brings his doctrine to them, that they may be 



84 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

more ignorant — and applies the remedy to them, that they may not be 
healed," is an honest avowal of the legitimate principles of this system. 
Surely then, no one will pretend, that, according to this doctrine, there is 
any grace for the reprobate. And perhaps a moment's attention will 
show, that there is little or none for the elect. It is said, that God, out 
of his mere sovereignty, without any thing in the creature to move him 
thereto, elects sinners to everlasting life. But if there is nothing in the 
creature to move him thereto, how can it be called mercy or compassion^ 
He did not determine to elect them, because they were miserable, but 
because he pleased to elect them. If misery had been the exciting 
cause, then as all were equally miserable, he would have elected them all. 
Is such a degree of election founded in love to the suffering object? No: 
it is the result of the most absolute and omnipotent selfishness conceivable. 
It is the exhibition of a character that sports most sovereignly and arbi- 
trarily, with his Almighty power, to create, to damn and to save. 

Answer. This objection is founded on the assumption, That the 
decrees of God destroy the moral agency and blameworthiness of sin- 
ners, and make God an arbitrary being, whose supreme regard for his 
own glory, destroys all his compassion for the miseries of his creatures. 
I have already shown, that this assumption is not true. The de- 
crees of God do not destroy, but secure the moral agency of his 
creatures. Nor does his supreme regard for his own glory imply 
that He has no regard for their miseries. On the contrary, He re- 
gards their miseries exactly according to their nature and import- 
ance. His tender mercies are over all his creatures, notwith- 
standing He has a supreme regard for his own glory and the 
good of the universe, in all his designs and conduct. No consistent 
Calvinist will say, that the miseries of creatures do not move the 
Divine compassion, but, only that their good is not the supreme end 
of the Divine government. 

Grace is the exercise of love to the guilty ; and mercy is the ex- 
ercise of love to the miserable. If the doctrine of election destroys 
the free grace and mercy of God, it must do this in one of two ways: 
it must either destroy the guilt and misery of creatures, or it must 
destroy the exercise of Divine love to the guilty and miserable. 
But it does neither the one nor the other. Notwithstanding the 
decree of unconditional election, mankind are in a guilty and perish- 
ing condition. And this eternal decree is the exercise of eternal 
love to guilty and perishing creatures. It is, therefore, both free, 
distinguishing grace, and sovereign, distinguishing mercy. 

An atonement is provided for all mankind; and all are naturally 
able to comply with the terms of Divine acceptance. In it self con- 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 85 

sidered, God sincerely desires the salvation of the reprobates : and 
He expresses this sincere desire in offering them pardon and eternal 
life, on terms with which they are naturally able to comply. These 
offers are sincere, because they express what God sincerely desires. 
Both saving grace and mercy therefore, are sincerely offered to the 
reprobates ; and nothing hinders their salvation, but their own un- 
willingness to accept the offered grace and mercy. 

Dr. F. gives the following representation of unconditional election : 
' lie did not determine to elect them because they were miserable, but 
because He pleased to elect them. If misery had been the exciting 
cause, then as all were equally miserable, he would have elected them 
all." This representation is not quite correct. It would be more 
correct to say, ' God did not elect them [MERELY] because they 
were miserable, but because He saw it to be wisest and best. If misery 
had been the [ONLY] exciting cause, then as all were equally miser a- 
able, He would have elected them all.' This representation would 
have been just, but not suitable to Dr. F's. purpose. Had he repre- 
sented the thing as it is, there would have been no propriety in the 
following question : "Is such a decree of election founded in love to 
the suffering object?' In this case he could have only asked, u Is 
such a decree of election founded [entirely] in love to the suffer- 
ing object V It was founded not only in love to the suffering ob- 
ject, but also in a supreme regard for his own glory, and the highest, 
and best interests of the universe. " God is love." He regards all 
objects and interests in the universe, exactly according to their na- 
ture and importance, both individually and collectively considered. 
This is disinterested, impartial, universal love, and is the foundation 
of the purposes of God, in general, and of the decree of uncondi- 
tional election in particular. And yet Dr. Fr ventures to say of un- 
conditional election, " It is the result of the most absolute and om- 
nipotent selfishness conceivable.'' ! It " It is the exhibition of a char- 
acter which sports most sovereignly and arbitrarily, with his Al- 
mighty power, to create, to damn, and to save." ! ! ! ! ! I am glad that 
Dr. F. is unwilling, that selfishness should reign, On reflection, 
then, will not Dr. F. rejoice that selfishness is not " omnipotent ; " 
and that it will never be able either to destroy or defeat the pur- 
poses of impartial, universal and infinite benevolence ? 

8 



86 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED, 

Obj. "3. The doctrine we oppose, makes God partial and a respecter 
of persons; contrary to express and repeated declarations of Scripture. 
For it represents God as determining to save some, and damn others^ 
without reference to their characters, all being precisely in the same 
state. To deny this, is to acknowledge, that the decree of election and 
reprobation had respect to character, which is to give up the doctrine.'* 

Answer. How can it be said, with truth, that election has no 
reference to character, when it fixes the character of the elect, as 
necessary to their salvation? And how can it be said, with truth 
that reprobation has no reference to character, when it fixes the 
character of the reprobates, as necessary to their damnation 1 

Dr. F. himself holds, that God has unconditionally elected some 
nations and communities, in distinction from others, to the means of 
salvation. If Dr. F. will show how God could do this, without be- 
ing partial and a respecter of persons, he will doubtless be able to 
reconcile the impartiality of God with the doctrine of unconditional 
and personal election to eternal life. 

The truth is, partiality does not consist merely in making a dif- 
ference ; but in making a difference without any good reason. God 
has the highest and best of reasons, for making the elect to -differ 
from the reprobates, both in time and eternity. These reasons are 
his own glory *]and the greatest good of the universe. He does not 
make this difference between the elect and the reprobates, because 
He has a partial regard for the elect, and no regard for the repro- 
bates ; but because his own glory, and the greatest good of the uni- 
verse require. It is not partiality, therefore, which leads him to make 
this difference among his creatures, but a pure, impartial regard for 
his own glory, and the highest and best interests of the universe. 

Obj. " 4. This doctrine is objectionable, because, contrary to express, 
and repeated passages of Scripture, it necessarily limits the atonement. 
To say nothing now of the utter uselessness of making an atonement for 
the reprobates, unless for the purpose of making their unavoidable dam- 
nation more aggravated, we would ask, what is the object of the atone- 
ment? Let these very Calvinists auswer. They tell us, that its object 
was, to open the way, by which it might be possible for sinners to be 
saved. But has the atonement made it possible for the reprobates to be 
saved? If so, then perhaps they will be saved, and therefore the idea of 
mconditional election and reprobation is false. But if the atonement 
aas only made it possible for the elect to be saved, then it was made on- 
ly for the elect. Let the supporters of this system choose which horn of 
this dilemma they please ; either will destroy their doctrine. For as it 
is absurd to talk about redeeming grace and gospel provisions, sufficient 
to save those who are eternally and effectually excluded from these bless- 
hngSs so it is idle to talk about a redemption for all, which includes pro- 



ARM1NIANISM EXAMINED. 87 

visions sufficient only to save the elect. Not even the fiction of a natural, 
ability in all men to serve God and get to Heaven, will help this difficul- 
ty. For allowing", in the argument, that the reprobates have ability to 
serve God and gain Heaven, without grace and in spite of God's decree, 
still, as this is called a natural ability it is plain, it is not the fruit of the 
atonement. It is equally irrelevant to argue, that the atonement may be 
said to be universal, because it contains enough to save the whole world, 
if they would or could embrace it, and it is only their excessive depravi- 
ty which renders it impossible for them to receive the atonement. For 
this is the same as to say that a physician has an efficient remedy to heal 
his patient, only he is so sick he cannot take it. This excessive weak- 
ness is that for which the physician should prescribe, and to which the 
medicine should be applied. And if it does not come to this, it is no 
medicine for this case. So the atonement, if it is not a remedy for man's 
extreme depravity, is no provision for him. If it does not give a gra- 
cious power to all sinners to embrace salvation, it has accomplished 
nothing* for the depraved reprobate. Since therefore, according to Cal* 
vinism, the atonement provides for the reprobate, neither natural nor 
moral ability to serve God, nor makes it possible for him to be saved, it 
follows, that the atonement is made only for the elect* But as this is 
contrary to the word of God, the doctrine that leads to this conclusion^ 
must be false. 

Answer. The atonement does not literally pay a debt, nor liter- 
ally take away the guilt and ill-desert of sinners. If it literally 
paid their debt, or took away their ill-desert, it would destroy their 
need of pardoning mercy, and render the forgiving grace of the 
gospel a mere farce. The atonement was not intended to destroy 
our need of forgiveness, but to lay a foundation for it. It was not 
intended to render the exercise of God's pardoning grace impossible; 
but only to render it possible, and consistent with his justice to him- 
self, and to his kingdom. The atonement of Christ does not oblige 
God in justice to have mercy on a single soul. It consisted in dis- 
playing God's regard to his law, and his hatred of sin, as fully as 
they could have been displayed in the condign punishment of sin- 
ners themselves ; so that justice and mercy may meet each other, in 
the salvation of believers. The atonement therefore, could not bo 
sufficient for the elect, without being sufficient for all mankind, i t 
could not lay a foundation for mercy to a single soul, without laying 
such a foundation, as would enable God, consitently with his justice, 
to ' have mercy on whom He will have mercy.' A universal atone- 
ment therefore, is not only consistent with particular election, but 
absolutely necessary to it. For if the atonement had not been suffi- 
cient for all, it could not have been sufficient for one; and, in this 
case, not a single soul could have been elected to eternal life, 



88 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

" But, says Dr. F., has the atonement made it possible for the repro- 
bates to be saved ? If so, then perhaps they will be saved, and the idea 
of unconditional electional and reprobation is false? 

This argument is founded on the assumption, that a natural pos- 
sibility of salvation is inconsistent with a previous certainty of dam- 
nation.. If it proves any thing, therefore, it proves too much. If it 
disproves unconditional election, it disproves Divine fore-knowledge. 
Thus it might be asked, ' Has the atonement made it possible for 
those to be saved, who God fore-knew would be lost? If so, then per- 
haps they will be saved, and therefore the idea of Divine fore-knowl- 
edge is false? The argument is just as conclusive in the one case, 
as in the other. The truth is, it is not conclusive in either case. 
A natural possibility, that an event should take place, is perfectly 
consistent with its being fore-known, decreed and infallibly certain, 
that it should not take place. It was fore-known, decreed and in- 
fallibly certain, that Christ should die ; and yet it was naturally pos- 
sible for him to deliver himself from death. It was fore-known, de- 
creed and infallibly certain, that Paul and his company would sur- 
vive the shipwreck and get safe to land. And yet it was naturally 
possioie ior tneiii to plunge themselves into the deep, and put an end 
to their own lives. Just so, the atonement renders it naturally pos- 
sible for the reprobates to be saved, notwithstanding it is infallibly 
certain that they will reject the atonement provided, and be lost. 

The Dr. calls the natural ability of sinners to do their duty, a ' fic- 
tion,' and says, it avails nothing, in as much as it is not the fruit of 
the atonement. But, because the natural ability of sinners to com- 
ply with the terms of salvation is not the fruit of the atonement, 
does it hence follow, that no atonement is made for them to render 
their salvation possible on their complying with those terms 1 

But Dr. F. says, " the atonement, if it is not a remedy for man's 
extreme depravity, is no provision for him." 

So argues the Universalist. And if you admit his premises, his 
conclusion is irresistible, that all mankind will be saved. For if the 
atonement be made for all mankind, and is not only a foundation 
for pardon, but a remedy for their depravity, they will certainly be 
saved. 

But in the following sentence, Dr. F. doubtless intends to ex- 
plain, what he means by " a remedy for their extreme depravity : '■ 
" If it does not give a gracious power to all sinners to embrace salva- 



ARMXNIANISM EXAMINED. 89 

tiion, it has accomplished nothing for the depraved reprobate." By 
this " gracious power v the Dr. means a self-determining principle 
in the will ; which according to his theory all moral agents must 
possess, whether saints or sinners, angels or devils. If it is possess- 
ed by an order of beings for whom no atonement has been made, 
why is it called " gracious power," and " fruit of the atonement? " 
I have already shown, that this self-determining principle is " a fic- 
tion ; '' but if it were a reality, it would be no remedy for the ex- 
treme depravity of sinners. If sinners possessed a self-determining 
principle, it would do them no good ; for so long as they retained 
their depraved- hearts, they would always use it wrong. 

The truth is, there are two obstacles in the way of the salvation 
of the sinner, which require two distinct remedies. One of these 
consists in his hell-desert, and the other, in the reigning depravity of 
his heart. The first can be remedied only by the atonement of 
Christ, and the second, only by the renewing and sanctifying influ- 
ence of the Holy Spirit. The atonement lays a foundation for par- 
don : and the Holy Spirit renews and sanctifies the heart. The 
atonement extends to all mankind ; but the renewing and sanctify- 
ing influence of the Holy Spirit, only to the elect. 

Obj. " 5. If time would permit, I might here notice, at some length ? 
several objections to this doctrine — Such as that it takes away all mo- 
tives to repentance, by giving the sinner just cause to say — "If I am to 
be saved, I shall be, do what I may ; and if I am to be damned, I must be, 
do what I can" — It leads to the idea of infant damnation — It weakens 
the zeal and paralyzes the efforts of devotion and benevolence — It de- 
stroys the end of punishment, the original design of which was to pre- 
vent sin — but which, according to this doctrine, was designed merely for 
the glory of God; and sin was ordained, for the purpose of giving God an 
opportunity of glorifying himself, in punishing it. These and others 
might be dwelt upon with effect — But passing them all, I hasten to the 
conclusion of my argumeuts, by urging only one more objection to the 
system I am opposing." 

Answer. " If time would permit " I could easily show, that the 
doctrine of election gives the sinner no more cause than the Divine 
fore-knowledge to say, "If I am to be saved, I shall be, do what I 
may : and if I am to be damned, I shall be, do what I can ; and 
that he has no more reason to say this, than to say, " If I am to live, I 
shall live, though I starve myself to death; and if I am to commit 
suicide, I certainly shall, though I never commit the fatal deed." 
" If time would permit '' I could easily show, that the doctrine of 

8* 



90 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 



election no more " leads to infant damnation " than the Divine fore- 
knowledge—That the doctrine of election awakens " the zeal" and 
encourages " the efforts of devotion and benevolence " — That it con- 
firms " the end of punishment, the original design of which was [not 
only] to prevent sin/' but to promote the glory of God ; and that sin 
was ordained not merely for the purpose of giving God an oppor- 
tunity to glorify his justice in its punishment, but also to glorify his 
grace in the scheme of redemption through Christ. ' These and 
and other remarks might be dwelt upon with effect.' But passing 
them all, I hasten to consider Dr. F's. last objection to the Calvin- 
istic system. 

Obj. "6. We are suspicious of this doctrine, because its advocates 
themselves, seem studious to cover up and keep out of sight, many of 
its features, and are constantly changing their manner of stating and de- 
fending their system. A little attention to the history of the controver- 
sy, between predestinarians and their opposers, will show the truth and 
force of this objection. The charge that Calvinism covers up and keeps 
out of sight, some of its most offensive features, does not lie so much a- 
gainst its advocates of the old school, as those of the modern. With the 
exception of some logical consequences, which we think chargeable up- 
on the system, and which they were unwilling to allow, these early de- 
fenders of unconditional election, came out boldly and fearlessly, with 
their doctrine." 

Answer. There is a good deal of weight in this objection. But 
it does not disprove the doctrine of unconditional election. It only 
proves that modern Calvinists are dishonest. 

The Calvinistic doctrines have, of late, been grossly misstated, 
misrepresented and concealed by a set of men, calling themselves 
Calvinists, but who are, in reality, nearer Arrninians than any thing 
else. The following remarks of Dr. F. are, with some slight ex- 
ceptions, just. 

"In perfect accordance with the foregoing, is the common explanation 
that is given, to the doctrine of election and reprobation. Reprobation is 
kept out of sight ; and yet it is as heartily believed by modern Calvinists 
as it was by John Calvin himself. It is taught too ; but it is taught cov- 
ertly. And yet when we quote old fashioned Calvinism in its primitive 
plain dre'ss, we are told these are old authors — we do not believe with 
them — "if we had lived in the days of our fathers, we would not have 
been partakers with them in their errors" and yet " they are witnessess 
unto themselves, that they are the children of them " who taught these 
errors. They recommend their writings, they garnish their sepulchres, 
they teach their catechisms to the rising generation — they say even in 
their church articles of faith — " We believe in- the doctrines of grace, as 
held and taught by the fathers and reformers, in the church," — and espe- 
cially do they hold to that root and foundation of the whole system, "God 
hath from all eternity, fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass," 



• ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 91 

IJ Since I have alluded to church articles, it will be in support of this 
objection to say, that the written creeds of churches, partake of this same 
ambiguous character. They are either expressed in texts of scripture, 
or in doubtful and obscure terms, so that different constructions can be 
put upon them, according to the faith of the subscriber. And instances 
have been known, in which articles of faith have been altered, again and 
again, to accommodate scrupulous candidates. And yet their candidates 
for holy orders, and for professorships, in their theological institutions, 
are required to subscribe to a rigid calvinistic creed. In this way, it is 
expected doubtless, that the doctrine will be maintained and perpetuated, 
though, in other respects public opinion should be accommodated. How 
would honesi John Calvin, if he could be introduced among us, with the 
same sentiments he had, when on earth, frown upon the churches, which 
bear his name. He would not only call them " silly and childish," but he 
would doubtless, in his bold, blunt manner, charge them with disingenu- 
ousness and cowardice, if not with downright duplicity, for thus shun- 
ning and smoothing over and covering up the more repulsive features of 
their system. How would he chide them, for shifting their ground, and 
changing their system, while they nevertheless pretend to build on the 
same foundation of predestination." 

I sincerely hope this reproof will be felt by all whom it may con- 
cern. 

NUMBER XVI. 

I have now examined Dr. Fisk's arguments in favor of condition- 
al, and his objections against unconditional election. In this num- 
ber, I intend to adduce several direct arguments in favor of the doc- 
trine in question. 

1. One argument in favor of unconditional election is founded 
on the doctrine of depravity. Mankind by nature, are dead in tres- 
passes and sins. They have that ' carnal mind which is enmity 
against God, not subject to his law, neither indeed can be.' " The 
heart of the sons of men is full of evil." " There is none [by na- 
ture] that seeketh after God." " The sacrifice of the wicked is 
abomination to the Lord." " The thoughts of the wicked are abom- 
ination to the Lord." " The way of the wicked is abomination to 
the Lord." They all turn away their ear from hearing the law of 
love : and " he that turneth away his ear from hearing the law, even 
his prayer shall be abomination." The very " ploughing of the 
wicked is sin." ■ Their heart is desperately wicked, and fully set 
in them to do evil.' 

The entire depravity of sinners, makes their salvation entirely 
dependent on the sovereign grace of God. They never will com- 
ply with the terms of Divine acceptance, unless God is pleased, of 
his own sovereign goodness, to bow their stubborn wills. As all 
are by nature children of disobedience, not a single sinner could be 
saved, unless he were elected to new and holy obedience. And as 



92 ARMINIANISM EXAMINE©. 

the elect are chosen to obedience as well as salvation, it is plain^ 
that their election is unconditional. 

2. Another argument in favor of unconditional election, is founded 
on the doctrine of regeneration. This argument, though involved 
in the preceding, deserves to be distinctly considered. " Except a 
man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." The saints 
" are born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will 
of man, but of God. 5 ' It is He that 'quickens them who were dead 
in trespasses and sins.' It is He that ' creates them in Christ Jesus, 
unto love and good works.' ' Love is the fruit of his spirit.' * He 
gives them repentance, to the acknowledging of the truth' ; and 
' faith is the gift of God.' Conversion and sanctification, therefore, 
are exclusively the work of God. And if they are the work of God, 
then they depend upon his will. And if they depend on his will, 
then they are fore-ordained. God has, therefore, willed or deter- 
mined the conversion and sanctification of the elect, as well as their 
salvation. 

But regeneration is unconditional. To suppose, that the sinner 
is regenerated upon any conditions performed by him, is extremely 
absurd. If there be any conditions of regeneration to be performed 
by the sinner, w 7 hat are they ? Are they regenerated on condition 
of love to God ? Love is the very essence of regeneration. Are 
they regenerated on condition of repentance ? Repentance implies 
regeneration. Are they regenerated on condition of faith? Faith 
also implies regeneration. Are they regenerated on condition of 
prayer ? Acceptable prayer likewise implies a heart already regen- 
erated. Are they regenerated on condition of any holy perform- 
ances ? To suppose this, is to suppose that they are regenerated on 
condition of their regeneration. For every holy, acceptable per- 
formance implies that the heart is already regenerated. But if they 
are not regenerated on condition of any previous holy performances, 
on what condition are they regenerated? Is it on condition of any 
unholy performances? To say that God regenerates sinners, on 
account of their unholy performances is to impeach the Divine 
character. Who will venture to assert, that unholy and sinful per- 
formances are acceptable in the sight of Him who cannot look upon 
iniquity? Will it be said, then, that sinners are regenerated upon 
condition of such*performances as are neither holy nor sinful ? If 
so, what are those performances? And what can there be in per- 
formances which are neither holy nor sinful, to render them pleas- 
ing to God, and constitute them a condition of his renewing grace ? 
To make regeneration conditional, is the grossest absurdity. Re- 
generation, therefore, is unconditional. And if regeneration is un- 
conditional ; then election is unconditional. 

3. Another argument in favor of unconditional election to eternal 
life is founded on the doctrine of the saints' perseverance. It is 
written : " My sheep hear my voice, and I know them and they 



ARxMlNIANISM EXAMINED. 93 

follow me : And I give unto them eternal life ; and they shall never 
perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand. My Father 
which gave them me is greater than all ; and none is able to pluck 
them out of my Father's hand. And I will make an everlasting 
covenant with them, that I will not turn away from them to do them 
good ; but I will put my fear in their hearts, that they shall not de- 
part from me. The steps of a good man are ordered by the Lord ; 
and he delighteth in his way. Though he fall, he shall not utterly 
be cast down ; for the Lord upholdeth him with his hand. To an 
inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, 
reserved in heaven for you, who are kept by the power of God 
through faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time. 
Being confident of this very thing, that he who hath begun a good 
work in you, will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ. More- 
over, whom he did predestinate, them he also called ; and whom he 
called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also 
glorified. For I am persuaded, that neither death nor life, nor an- J 
gels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present, nor things to 
come, Nor height nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able 
to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our 
Lord." 

It appears from Scripture, then, that the saints will persevere in 
obedience until death. And their perseverance depends not upon 
any self-determining principle in their hearts, but upon projnised, 
sanctifying grace. And if they are preserved, as saints, by the 
sanctifying grace of God; then they are entirely dependent upon it, 
for sanctification. And if they are dependent for sanctification ; 
then they were likewise dependent for their conversion, upon the 
Divine will. The doctrine of the saints' perseverance, as it is 
taught in the Scriptures, therefore, demonstrates the absolute and 
entire dependence of the saints upon the Divine will, for all their 
holy exercises. And their entire dependence upon God, for every 
thing that is holy and acceptable to him, demonstrates, that their 
election is unconditional. 

4. The doctrine of unconditional election may be argued from ' 
the atonement of Christ. It is unreasonable to suppose that God 
the Father would have given up his only and well-beloved Son to 
die the just, for the unjust, without securing to him the reward of 
his obedience unto death. Accordingly we are informed, that God 
has given his son a seed to serve him; that Christ shall see of the 
travail of his soul, and be satisfied ; and that his people shall be 
willing in the day of his power. Christ said himself, " All that the 
Father hath given me, shall come to me ; and him that cometh to 
me, I will in no wise cast out : but will raise him up at the last day." 

Christ would not have been sure of his reward, had the conver- 
sion of sinners and the sanctification of saints been left to a ' self- 
determining principle of the human will.' Indeed Christ would 



94 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

have been sure of losing his reward, had the conversion and sancti- 
fication of the elect, been left to their own sinful hearts. It is just 
as certain, therefore, that God has determined the conversion and 
sanctification of the elect, as it is, that he has secured to his Son the 
'promised reward of his obedience unto death. 

5. The doctrine of personal and unconditional election to eternal 
life, may be inferred from the unconditional appointment and dis- 
tribution of the means to salvation. God has appointed the means 
of salvation, and He sends them wherever He pleases. He sends 
the preached gospel to some nations and communities, families and 
individuals, and not to others. In this He must have some design. 
He certainly does more for some, than for others, so far as it re- 
spects the means of salvation. These means in multitudes of in- 
stances, become effectual to the conversion and salvation of sinners; 
while those to whom these means are not sent, are generally lost. 
It is written, "The dark places of tfye earth, are full of the habita- 
tions of cruelty" ; and ' where no vision is,, the people perish.' 

When these means become effectual in the hand of God to the 
conversion and sanctification of men, it is absurd to suppose, that 
they do not produce the effect which God intended they should pro- 
duce. It is absurd to suppose, that He has ever appointed and used 
them in vain. And it is no less unscriptural than absurd. He has 
expressly said that i his word shall not return unto him void, that it 
shall accomplish that which He pleases, and prosper in the thing 
whereto he sends it. 5 

The efficacy of the means which God uses with sinners, depends 
entirely upon his influence. Paul may plant and Apollos water; 
but God giveth the increase. " So then, neither is he that planteth 
any thing, neither he that watereth ; but God that giveth the in- 
crease." The conversion and sanctification of sinners, therefore, 
necessarily depends upon the will of God. 

Since God has provided the means of salvation at infinite expense ; 
it is absurd to suppose, that He has provided them without determin- 
ing their result. They are distributed and used in infinite wisdom ; 
and it is absurd to suppose that they are distributed and used with- 
out design. They sometimes prove a savor of life unto life, and 
sometimes a savor of death unto death ; and it is absurd to suppose 
that infinite Wisdom and Benevolence would leave such infinitely 
important results to chance and contingency. They cannot become 
effectual to conversion and sanctification in a single instance, with- 
out his agency ; and it is absurd to suppose, that God ever accom- 
panies these means with the awakening, renewing, sanctifying and 
saving influence of his Spirit, without previously intending to do 
this. And if He previously intended to effect their conversion and 
sanctification ; then He always had that intention. For, since He 
is unchangeable. He has not formed his intentions in time ? but in 
eternity, . 



ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 95 

6. Another argument in favor of uncondttional election, is founded 
on the goodness of God. His goodness is absolutely perfect, un- 
changeable, and eternal. He cannot, therefore, be indifferent to 
the holiness and happiness of any of his creatures. He is morally 
obliged to choose in itself considered, whatever is desirable in itself 
considered ; and to choose all things considered, whatever is de- 
sirable all things considered. Now the conversion and sanctifica- 
tion of the elect, are desirable both in themselves considered, and 
all things considered. This will be admitted on all sides. The 
goodness of God, therefore, must necessarily dispose him to choose 
their conversion and sanctification both in themselves considered 
and all things considered, and his unchangeable and eternal good- 
ness must have disposed him to do this from all eternity. But to 
say, that God, from eternity did, all things considered, choose the 
conversion and sanctification of the elect, as well as their salvation, 
is all that is meant by the doctrine of unconditional and personal 
election to eternal life. And we have just as much evidence, that 
such was the choice of God from eternity, as we have, that his 
goodness is infinite, unchangeable and eternal. 

7. There is evidence in favor of the doctrine of unconditional 
and personal election to eternal life, in the ultimate end of the Di- 
vine operations. This end is the fullest exercise, expression, result 
and gratification of the goodness of God in all its branches. This 
end could be perfectly attained, only in the scheme of redemption. 
It is only in this scheme that He can possibly exercise, display and 
gratify his grace and justice consistently with each other. And in 
this scheme, He exercises, displays and gratifies air his perfections 
more fully than He could have done in any other way. He has 
concentrated all his glory in the face of Jesus Christ. Christ is the 
brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person. 
Accordingly the scheme of redemption through Christ is represent- 
ed in Scripture, as comprising all the designs and operations of Je- 
hovah. " Who created all things by Jesus Christ, to the intent, 
that now unto principalities and powers in heavenly places, might 
be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God, according to 
his eternal purpose which he purposed in Jesus Christ our Lord. 5 ' 
The accomplishment of this scheme requires the conversion, sancti- 
fication and salvation of the elect through Jesus Christ. 

It is absurd to suppose, that God fixed the end from eternity 
without fixing the means. That He devised the scheme of redemp- 
tion, without securing its accomplishment. - That, after creating 
the heavens and earth for this glorious purpose, and laying the 
foundation for its accomplishment in the blood of his well beloved 
Son, He should after all, suspend the great end of all his designs 
and sacrifices and exertions, on the contingency of a self-determin- 
ing principle of human depravity. Is not God morally bound by a- 



96 ARMINIANISM EXAMINED. 

regard for himself to secure the infallible accomplishment of the 
great end of all his designs and operations ? 

8. Another argument in favor of unconditional election, is found- 
ed on the Divine fore-knowledge of the conversion and sanctifica- 
tion of the elect. God could not have fore-known their conversion 
and sanctification unless they were certain. And this certainty 
must necessarily have depended on the Divine will. It is just as 
certain, therefore, that God has determined. the conversion and 
sanctification of those who are saved, as that He has always fore- 
known their conversion and sanctification. 

9. Another argument in favor of unconditional election is found- 
ed on the dependence of creatures. u We are not sufficient, of 
ourselves, to think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is 
of God." Since men are constantly and entirely dependent upon 
God, it necessarily depends upon his will, whether they shall repent 
and be saved, or continue impenitent, and be lost. The necessary, 
constant and entire dependence of men, demonstrates not only the 
truth of predestination in general, but, of the unconditional election 
of those who are saved in particular. 

10. Finally the Scriptures on this subject are plain and decisive. 
It is written, " Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power." 
God says to his elect, ' A new heart will I give you, and a new 
Spirit will I put within you, and I will take away the stony heart 
out of your flesh and will give you an heart of flesh/ And again, 
' I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my 
statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments and do them.' Why 
should God thus promise conversion and sanctification if they did 
not depend upon his will, and were not fore-ordained? "Even so 
then, at this present time also, there is a remnant according to the 
election of grace. And if by grace, then it is no more of works ; oth- 
erwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no 
more grace ; otherwise work is no more work. What then, Israel 

tf^~hath obtained that which he seeketh for, but the election hath ob- 
tained" it and the rest were blinded. For he saith to Moses, I will 
have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will have compas- 
sion on whom I will have compassion. So then, it is not of him 
that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth 
mercy. Therefore hath he mercy, on whom he will have mercy, 
and whom he will he hardeneth." 

In conclusion, I, would state, that this review has not been dic- 
tated by any personal hostility against Dr. Fisk*. I respect him for 
his talents and honesty. Nor is it intended to injure rather than 
benefit my brethren of the Methodist denomination. Nor is it in- 
tended for the benefit of Methodists alone. For I firmly believe 
that some Methodists are far more orthodox both in heart and 
head, than very . many who call themselves Calvinists. This review 
is sincerely dedicated to Arminians of every name and denomination. 






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